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FOREWORD 
 
Each year the Centre for Monetary Economics (CME) at The Department of Economics, BI 
Norwegian School of Management, appoints an independent group of experts to evaluate 
monetary policy in Norway.  
This year the committee consists of Knut Anton Mork, Chief Economist Norway at 
Handelsbanken, Xavier Freixas, Professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, and 
Kyrre Aamdal, Senior Economist at DNB. 
The committee is solely responsible for the report and the views therein. The report does not 
necessarily represent the views of the CME or of its members. 
The Ministry of Finance partly funds the Norges Bank Watch reports, which contain useful 
information and analyses for the Ministry’s evaluation of monetary policy that is presented 
each year in a White Paper to Parliament.  
 
 
Oslo, 24 February 2014 
Centre for Monetary Economics 
Arne Jon Isachsen 
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 Introduction and main recommendations 
This report is based on careful considerations of Norges Bank’s policy decisions, Monetary 
Policy Reports (MPR), and other communication, during 2013.1 We have also benefitted from 
extensive discussions with representatives of Norges Bank, the Ministry of Finance, and the 
Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA, Finanstilsynet), as well as fellow economists in 
academia and financial institutions. Armed with this information, we have sought to evaluate 
Norges Bank’s actions and communication in view of the research literature, especially within 
the areas of monetary economics and macrofinance. We have also looked at some broader 
issues concerning the institutional setup of Norwegian monetary policy as well as a set of 
research topics that we feel should be given priority to further improve the basis for 
Norwegian monetary policy making. 
Our main recommendations are the following: 
 In order to ensure a sufficient capacity for decision making in times of crisis, we 
recommend the establishment of a Monetary Policy Committee separate from Norges 
Bank’s Executive Board (henceforth referred to as “the board”). This committee 
would deal exclusively with monetary policy, albeit broadly defined, including issues 
of financial stability and the Bank’s role as lender of last resort, whereas the oversight 
of Norges Bank Investment Management and other administrative issues should be 
left to the board. 
 In view of the implementation of the Countercyclical Capital Buffer for banks as well 
as other macroprudential instruments, we recommend that Norges Bank return to 
setting its policy rate mainly according to the standard criteria of flexible inflation 
targeting, with less regard to financial stability, materialized in the behaviour of asset 
prices and credit growth, than appears to have been the case lately. 
 We recommend strengthening of research in the following areas: 
o The causes and effects of inflation in open economies; 
o The forces driving the level and volatility of the krone exchange rate, its role 
in the transmission of shocks and policy, and the vulnerabilities arising from 
capital outflows and inflows;  
                                                 
1 Katrine Boye, Nordea Markets, participated in an early part of the project before leaving because of a conflict 
of interest, after which Kyrre Aamdal took her place. The authors want to thank Norges Bank for useful 
comments and the BI Centre for Monetary Economics for inviting them to undertake this study as well as for 
generous financial support. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily coincide with 
those of the CME or their respective employers. 
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o Institutional and market aspects of wage formation in the Norwegian labour 
market; 
o The global oil and gas markets and the functioning and ripple effects of the 
domestic petroleum industry; and 
o The functioning of financial markets in Norway and linkages to the rest of the 
world. 
 In terms of communication, we recommend that the Monetary Policy Reports (MPR) 
be presented as a report of staff analysis rather than as the Governor’s report. 
Our report is organized as follows. Section 1 gives an executive summary, including a listing 
of all our recommendations. Section 2 gives an overview of Norwegian monetary policy in 
2013 and our evaluation thereof. Section 3 discusses the relationship between flexible 
inflation targeting and macroprudential instruments. Section 4 takes a closer look at Norges 
Bank’s research and communication, and Section 5 presents our views of the relevant 
institutional issues. 
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1. Executive Summary 
Norges Bank had six policy meetings during 2013. Monetary Policy Reports (MPRs) were 
issued after four of these meetings, in March, June, September, and December. After each of 
the two in-between meetings, in May and October, the Bank published a press release and a 
one- or two-page note titled, “The Executive Board’s policy decision—background and 
general assessment.” In addition, webcasted press conferences were held after all six 
meetings. We join previous Norges Bank Watch reports in commending this thorough effort 
to communicate with the public. 
The Norwegian economy entered 2013 on a somewhat weakening trend, as reported in the 
October 2012 MPR. This weakening continued more or less throughout the year 2013, 
although the sources of weakness shifted somewhat. During the first half of the year, the chief 
weakening impulses came from abroad, especially the eurozone. As this picture brightened a 
little later in the year, domestic weakening forces took over, mainly in the form of a 
prospective levelling out of the oil and gas activities on the Norwegian continental shelf after 
strong growth through most of last year. Private consumption also levelled out in the second 
half, and mainland business investments fell. The continued weakening appears to have taken 
Norges Bank by surprise as growth and the output gap consistently were revised downward in 
the March, September, and December reports. 
Inflation also tended to surprise on the downside and had done so for several years. In 
response to these consistent prediction errors, Norges Bank did a special study of costs in the 
Norwegian retail industry. The study found that the costs had risen more slowly in this 
industry than in the rest of the mainland economy; and the Bank revised its forecasting 
procedures accordingly for the March MPR. We consider this revision quite sensible despite 
the fact that it was followed by some substantial upside surprises in the following months. 
These surprises seem to have been the joint result of procedural changes in the computation of 
the CPI, statistical noise, and—not least—the krone weakening that started in February 2013. 
Inflation for domestically produced goods and services continued to weaken as demand 
pressure softened with the weakening economy. Decelerating wages were part of this picture 
as unemployment started to rise, albeit quite slowly. 
Despite all these changes in the outlook, Norges Bank left its policy rate unchanged at all six 
policy meetings last year. Shifts in the policy stance were instead communicated as forecast 
revisions for the future policy rate. We are somewhat critical of this pattern because it may be 
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construed as timidity regarding actual changes. We are also somewhat concerned that it may 
lull people into believing that rates will remain unchanged more or less forever and its current 
low level encourage excessive risk taking. 
The decisions to leave the policy rate unchanged appear to have been highly predictable as 
very few analysts had expected changes. This seems to indicate that Norges Bank has been 
successful in communicating its reaction pattern. The same cannot quite be said about the 
forecast revisions because market reactions sometimes were noticeable as forward interest 
rates fell and the krone continued to weaken. 
Norges Bank used the krone weakening as an argument against easing. This becomes 
apparent from the exhibition of the Bank’s interest-rate accounting in each MPR. In graph 
form, it presents the contributions to the changes in the policy rate forecast by each of a set of 
perceived exogenous shocks. This display is informative about Norges Bank’s analyses and 
widely studied by analysts and market participants. A weakness in our view is that it gives an 
exaggerated impression of precision. For example, an outside observer could easily view the 
krone weakening entirely as the result of the lowered interest-rate expectations. As such, it 
should have no independent effect on monetary policy. Norges Bank chose, however, to 
classify it partly as exogenous FX shocks, unrelated to interest-rate expectations. That choice 
has then apparently become an argument against easing as well as further lowering of the 
interest-rate forecast. We consider this choice somewhat subjective, however. Thus, 
 We recommend that Norges Bank give a clearer explanation for why part of last year’s 
krone weakening was classified as FX shocks and how this classification affected the 
policy decisions. 
In addition to the preferred future policy-rate path, each MPR last year contained a separate 
presentation of what this path would have looked like if Norges Bank had considered only the 
standard criteria for flexible inflation targeting, that is, inflation and the output gap over time. 
In each case, this alternative trajectory was lower than the preferred one and sometimes 
included rate cuts, in one case of as much as one percentage point. The difference can serve as 
an estimate of the extent to which Norges Bank gave special weight to discouraging risk 
taking so as to ensure financial stability. As discussed below, we find this weight excessive in 
view of the implementation of macroprudential regulatory measures. 
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The global financial crisis served as a reminder of the importance of the financial system and 
its stability. While interest-rate decisions remain important, central banks cannot ignore 
credit, liquidity, and their own roles as lenders of last resort. The importance of financial 
stability lies in the adverse effects that financial turmoil, such as a disruption of the payment 
system can have on inflation and real activity in the short and long run. Thus, taking better 
account of the financial sector does not add a new dimension to the targets of monetary 
policy, but requires a better analysis of the financial sector’s role in the transmission of policy. 
We get the impression that this issue is well understood within Norges Bank. We furthermore 
believe that this is the reason why the three last MPRs of 2013 avoided explicit mention of the 
mathematical loss function with a separate term for the deviation of the nominal interest rate 
from its long-term normal value that was introduced in the March 2012 MPR. 
 We recommend that Norges Bank communicate explicitly to the public that this 
formula no longer applies and that concerns about financial stability be based on 
sound judgement until the financial sector is more satisfactorily modelled. 
Besides interest rates, regulatory authorities have a fairly wide arsenal of macroprudential 
instruments for maintaining financial stability, one of which is the countercyclical capital 
buffer requirement for banks. The Norwegian government decided in October 2013 that the 
activation of this buffer is to be determined quarterly by the Ministry of Finance based on 
analysis by and advice from Norges Bank. Norges Bank presented the principles of this 
analysis in the first three MPRs of 2013. The December 2013 MPR presented the analysis 
underlying the Bank’s first quarterly advice to the Ministry, naturally without stating the 
actual recommendation. 
The mechanism of having the Ministry make the decision based on Norges Bank’s analysis 
and advice seems to provide incentives for the Ministry to base its decisions on sound 
economic arguments rather than political expediency. However, in the interest of 
transparency, 
 We recommend that the Ministry of Finance allow Norges Bank to publish its advice 
to the Ministry on the countercyclical buffer immediately upon communicating it to 
the Ministry. 
Together with other capital requirements, the countercyclical buffer seeks to improve the 
resiliency of the financial system. Although this objective obviously is important, the view 
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expressed in our conversations with Norges Bank, the FSA, and the Ministry of Finance was 
mainly that this is the only effect the buffer is expected to have. In contrast, a sizeable body of 
international research also suggests significant effects on the cost and availability of credit. 
This effect should be especially high in Norway provided the government succeeds in its 
efforts to coordinate these regulations with the other Nordic countries so that leakage to 
foreign credit providers can be limited. Other regulatory instruments, such as loan-to-value 
and debt-to-income ratios pull in the same direction. We believe that the presence of these 
instruments significantly weakens the argument for keeping interest rates higher than what is 
indicated by the conventional targets for flexible inflation targeting. 
 We thus recommend that Norges Bank return to basing its rate-setting decisions 
mainly on the standard criteria of flexible inflation targeting, with less regard for asset 
prices and excessive credit growth than has been the case recently. 
Giving excessive weight to financial stability concerns is a problem because it costs jobs and 
undermines the central bank’s commitment to long-term price stability. An important signal 
about this stability lies in the central bank’s own inflation forecasts. Policy plans should lead 
inflation back to target by the end of the forecast period, which for Norges Bank is three 
years. In this respect, we are troubled by the fact that the June 2011 MPR was the last in 
which forecasted inflation reaches the inflation target at the end of the forecast horizon. In all 
subsequent reports, these forecasts end up ¼ to ¾ percentage points below the target. We are 
especially concerned about the two most recent reports, where at the same time the forecasted 
output gap stays negative throughout the forecast horizon. This means that the main force that 
should be driving inflation back to target—namely, high real activity—is absent. So, Norges 
Bank’s claims that inflation eventually approaches target do not seem credible. Thus, in order 
not to risk slippage in the public’s confidence in long-term price stability, 
 We recommend that Norges Bank’s future policy plans be formulated so as to bring 
inflation back to target as well as GDP back to potential within the MPR forecasting 
horizon. A deviation of inflation from target at that horizon should only be tolerated if 
the GDP forecast simultaneously deviates from potential GDP in the opposite 
direction. 
The standard analytical framework for flexible inflation targeting has mainly been worked out 
for closed economies. It thus ignores key elements that are essential for understanding the 
workings of small, open economies, of which Norway is a prime example. We applaud 
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Norges Bank’s efforts to have its analyses reflect the openness of the economy and especially 
its recent initiative to launch a special research project covering these elements. We would 
like to suggest some topics worth covering. 
Because the inflation process in some ways is different in an open than in a closed economy, 
it is not obvious that monetary policy should target the consumer price index (CPI). 
 We recommend that research at Norges Bank continue to explore the inflation process 
in open economies and consider alternative target indicators including, among others, 
the mainland GDP deflator. 
Although the exchange rate cannot serve as a separate target for flexible inflation targeting, it 
is central to the transmission mechanism for monetary policy in an open economy. Thus, 
 We recommend that research at Norges Bank seek a more accurate understanding of 
the forces driving the level and volatility of the krone exchange rate, its role in the 
transmission of shocks and policy, and the vulnerabilities arising from capital outflows 
and inflows forces. 
Concerns about the balance of payments are naturally much less important with a floating 
exchange rate and an open capital account than in a fixed-exchange-rate regime with capital 
controls. However, in periods of financial instability, cross-border debtor-creditor 
relationships may become relevant. The current account may furthermore return to focus 
when Norway’s petroleum age eventually comes to an end. Thus, 
 We recommend that research in Norges Bank give some more attention to the various 
elements of the balance of payment. 
Norwegian wage formation is a complex combination of collective bargaining and local and 
individual adjustments, with the added complication of the inflow of foreign workers. This 
system seems to have worked well in recent years. However, much less is known about how it 
can be expected to work under stress in a crisis situation. Moreover, Norges Bank’s modelling 
of the labour market and wage formation does not seem to reflect the complexity of the 
Norwegian system. Therefore, 
 We recommend that a comprehensive effort be made to better understand and properly 
model the behaviour of the Norwegian labour market. 
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As of today, the detailed and comprehensive high-frequency data on employment, 
unemployment, and wages needed to undertake this effort are not available. 
 We recommend that Statistics Norway significantly improve its production of labour 
market statistics by enlarging the Labour Market Survey (AKU) sample to permit the 
publication of proper monthly data, and by adding a monthly establishment survey 
covering employment as well as wages. 
What obviously sets Norway apart from other advanced economies is the relative size of its 
petroleum industry. We are somewhat surprised that Norges Bank has not been more 
aggressive in building its expertise on the global as well as national economics of this 
industry. 
 We recommend that Norges Bank spends more resources on strengthening its research 
efforts on the global oil and gas markets as well as the role of the domestic petroleum 
industry, including its effects on the rest of the economy. 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, much of the research of the international macro 
and finance community has focused on the functioning of the financial markets and how 
crises can arise when these markets fail to function properly. Although we understand that 
Norges Bank is making efforts to better model the role of the financial sector in the 
transmission of shocks to the real economy, we will also emphasize the importance of shocks 
arising in the financial industry. 
 We recommend that Norges Bank give higher priority to research on the functioning 
of the financial markets. 
An important international link for the Norwegian financial markets is provided by the 
NIBOR market, which is based on a combination of the eurodollar market and currency swaps 
to convert the loans from dollars to kroner, based on covered interest parity (CIP). During the 
financial crisis, this arrangement produced an exceptionally steep NIBOR curve because CIP 
failed to hold. After Norges Bank’s decision in 2010 to limit banks’ deposits with the central 
bank at the overnight (policy) rate, the Bank took an initiative to organise an overnight 
(NOWA) market in Norwegian kroner proper. Although we fear the consequences of the 
additional interconnectedness created by the limitation of banks’ deposits with the central 
bank, we applaud the initiative to create a krone overnight market. We recognize that the 
choice of organisation for the NIBOR market is far from trivial. However, 
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 We recommend that Norges Bank carefully study the organization of the NIBOR 
market in view of the crucial role played by CIP, why CIP failed during the financial 
crisis, and whether other institutional arrangements focusing directly on the possible 
arbitrages could be possible, and perhaps reduce the need for special liquidity 
measures during times of crisis. 
Although the MPRs have loosened their reliance on formal models over time, the reliance on 
the philosophy underlying DSGE modelling is unmistakable. This becomes apparent, for 
example, in the so-called interest-rate accounting, which tends to gloss over the subjective 
elements that inevitably go into the translation of news into model shocks. We find this 
unfortunate because these elements sometimes significantly affect the interest-rate 
accounting. The exposition thus gives an exaggerated impression of precision, which is not 
overcome by the addition of uncertainty fans around the forecast graphs. 
The philosophy underlying the DSGE modelling is even more important for interpreting the 
results. The recommended policy rate is optimal only as the starting point for the predicted 
future path of interest rates. Furthermore, for this prediction to be optimal, all agents in the 
economy must hold the same belief about the future as the central bank’s forecasts, and, these 
beliefs must be correct. This is a tall order. Although this kind of modelling typically assumes 
what the professional literature calls rational expectations, it goes beyond the common 
understanding of rationality in that it leaves no room for reasonable disagreement. We rather 
view disagreement as a necessary condition for meaningful dialogue and debate. This is one 
of the reasons why we want to see Norges Bank’s board members engage in public debate 
about policy. We return to this issue below. 
Formally, the MPR is presented as the Governor’s report. This means that disagreements 
between the staff and the Governor will not be revealed. Our preference would be to have at 
least some such disagreement revealed, just like we, as discussed below, would like to be 
informed about disagreements within the board. 
On the other hand, the board in practice participates in the iterative process in that preliminary 
analyses are discussed at board meetings in between policy meetings. This further obscures 
the various inputs that have gone into the analysis. As a way to clarify these issues, 
 We recommend that the MPR be a report of staff analysis rather than that of the 
Governor or the board. 
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A consequence could then be that the board decides on a different policy rate than the one 
recommended in the MPR; and the board could signal a different forward guidance than the 
one implied by the MPR forecasts. We would consider such a development healthy because 
the disagreements thus revealed could help rather than hurt a deeper understanding of the 
policy making process among the general public. 
Whereas Norges Bank, like Sweden’s Riksbank and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, gives 
forward guidance in the form of interest-rate forecasts in calendar time, other central banks 
have issued more conditional guidance to describe the conditions under which interest rates 
are likely to be raised again. Such conditional guidance gives more of a context and has the 
advantage of reducing uncertainty because it is easily understood, by market participants as 
well as the public at large. We suspect that it may even be more credible. On the other hand, 
the unconditional rate forecasts in calendar time contain useful information about Norges 
Bank’s analysis and clearly about its intentions. 
 We thus recommend that the practice of forecasting future policy rates be continued, 
but that Norges Bank explore the possibility of supplementing these forecasts with 
more conditional guidance. 
A number of previous vintages of Norges Bank Watch have made a range of 
recommendations regarding institutional issues concerning Norwegian monetary policy. 
Because the majority of these recommendations have yet to be followed, we repeat many of 
them and add some of our own. 
Whereas most other advanced-country central banks are subject to oversight by the legislative 
branches of their respective governments, Norges Bank is subordinate to the Ministry of 
Finance. Although we have seen no indication that this setup has translated into actual policy 
subordination in recent years, it is unfortunate and should be changed. 
 We recommend that the democratic oversight of Norges Bank be moved from the 
Ministry of Finance to Parliament. 
At the very least, 
 We recommend that the regular meetings between the Governor and the Minister of 
Finance before every policy meeting be discontinued. 
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Although Norges Bank’s operational mandate seems clear, the formal Regulation on 
monetary policy is ambiguous in that its introduction refers to the krone’s “national and 
international value.” 
 We recommend that the reference to the krone’s international value be taken out of the 
formal mandate. 
Norges Bank’s board differs from many other central bank boards in that the public never gets 
to hear the members’ individual views in terms of minutes or public speeches or comments by 
the external members. Minutes and speeches would naturally uncover disagreements. We 
repeat, however, our belief that public expression of disagreement is healthy and that it would 
strengthen Norges Bank’s legitimacy rather than weaken it. 
 We recommend that the external board members express their views in public. 
 We also recommend that voting records with attribution be released immediately as 
part of the press release after each monetary policy meeting and that unattributed 
minutes of the discussion be published after a reasonably short lag. 
A separate challenge, unique to Norges Bank, arises from its role as host for the Government 
Pension Fund Global (GPFG), popularly referred to as the oil fund, in Norges Bank 
Investment Management (NBIM). Thus, the Governor holds responsibility for the investments 
that this fund makes; and the board has the oversight responsibility for these activities in 
addition to its monetary policy tasks. We are concerned that the sum of these tasks may be 
excessive for a board whose majority are external members who also hold regular full-time 
jobs. This combination of duties may have been acceptable during the early stage of NBIM’s 
existence when the GPFG was small and relatively simple. With a fund of about NOK 5 
trillion, invested in a complex set of assets, we are concerned that the board’s capacity may be 
strained. Although we have seen no indications of specific problems so far, we are seriously 
concerned about the board’s ability to act effectively during an international crisis, which 
would require substantial special attention to fund management and monetary policy at the 
same time, including the Bank’s role as lender of last resort. 
We see various ways in which this situation could be improved. One would be to move NBIM 
out of Norges Bank, but the discussion of such changes lies beyond our mandate. Under the 
assumption that NBIM remain as part of Norges Bank, we instead point to the possibility of 
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appointing two different boards, with different tasks and with members with correspondingly 
different skills. 
 We recommend the formation a monetary policy committee to be led by the Governor 
and composed by members with expertise in monetary policy making. This board 
would deal exclusively with monetary policy, albeit broadly defined, including issues 
of financial stability and the Bank’s role as lender of last resort. 
 In addition, we recommend the formation of a board of oversight for Norges Bank’s 
entire organisation, including, in particular, NBIM. This board would not necessarily 
be led by the Governor and should include members with expertise in and experience 
with the economic and legal issues involved in asset management. 
As a last point, we offer some thoughts about the recruitment of outside members to the board 
or a future monetary policy committee. Because economists employed by financial 
institutions are ineligible for obvious reasons, the available supply of qualified people is in 
practice limited to academia and the non-financial business community. Because Norway is a 
small country, we are concerned that this supply may be exhausted. Participation by 
foreigners may be somewhat limited for language reasons. However, because of the similarity 
of the Scandinavian languages, 
 We recommend that candidates from other Scandinavian countries be considered for 
external board membership. 
Because foreign board members may offer alternative perspectives on Norwegian as well as 
global issues, their participation may improve the quality of the decision making. 
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2. Monetary policy in 2013 
After lowering the policy rate to 1.50 per cent at the monetary policy meeting in March 2012, 
Norges Bank has kept policy rates unchanged throughout 2013. However, its forecasts for 
future rate movements were revised repeatedly. These revisions were influenced by the 
changes in the outlook for inflation and real activity throughout the year. During 2013 the 
outlook for the economy deteriorated. Norges Bank lowered the forecasts for growth in 
mainland GDP by 1 percentage point for both 2013 and 2014. On the other hand the core 
inflation rose markedly and the Norwegian krone weakened substantially during the year.  
In evaluating Norges Bank’s performance during 2013, we focus on three criteria. 
First, were the policy decisions anticipated by market participants? If so, that would speak 
well of the transparency of the Bank’s decision criteria and therefore of the Bank’s ability to 
manage market expectations. 
Second, did the decisions make sense in view of the development prior to the respective 
policy meetings? At this point, we look not only at the rate decisions, but also at the changes 
to the Bank’s rate forecasts and whether the two types of decisions are well balanced against 
each other. 
Third, we look at how Norges Bank balanced concerns about financial stability against the 
standard criteria of flexible inflation targeting. This balance depends on the availability of 
other macroprudential instruments, such as the countercyclical capital buffer. 
Chart 2.1 Growth in Mainland GDP 2013 and 2014 
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2.1 Entering 2013 
The situation in financial markets improved steadily in the latter half of 2012.The last 
monetary policy report (MPR) prior to entering 2013 was released 31 October 2012, and 
Norges Bank’s last monetary policy meeting was 19 December. In its October 2012 report, 
Norges Bank commented that the growth prospects for the industrial nations had been 
repeatedly adjusted downwards for a long time. Norges Bank pointed out that the global 
economy may be close to bottoming out, but predicted that growth in the industrial countries 
would remain low for a long time. Norges Bank also noted that risk premiums in money and 
credit markets had declined, even though a number of countries were still facing a very 
difficult economic situation. Inflation in Norway had not only been low; it was lower than 
expected. Norges Bank remarked that the external price impulses into the Norwegian 
economy were weak due to lower imported inflation, increased competition and high labour 
immigration that may have contributed to dampening cost growth in some industries. 
Furthermore, the NOK had strengthened more quickly than anticipated. 
These factors pulled in the direction of lower interest rates. According to Norges Bank’s 
assessment, capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy was higher than usual and the 
Bank predicted a rise in inflation going forward. In addition, the central bank pointed out that 
persistently low interest rates for a long period of time can lead both households and 
businesses to take on too much risk and accumulate too much debt. This was one of the 
factors that weighed against a rate cut. Premiums in money and credit markets plunged in the 
autumn, but the Bank’s lending rates remained unchanged. Norges Bank thus did not appear 
to attach much importance to the decline in money market rates. The interest rate path that 
was presented indicated a possible rate hike sometime between March and September of 
2013. 
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Chart 2.2 Factors behind changes in the interest rate forecast 
 
 
The interest rate was not changed in the monetary policy meeting of 19 December 2012, 
either. The reasons given for this were weak economic trends for our partners in trade, low 
interest rates abroad, and low price growth at home. However, the Bank commented that, 
“Developments in the Norwegian economy give reason to believe that inflation will gradually 
pick up. This suggests that the key policy rate could be raised in time.”  
In 2013 Norges Bank increased the frequency of its MPRs from three to four per year, in 
March, June, September and December. The change was mainly justified by Norges Bank’s 
new role as an advisor to the Ministry of Finance on the countercyclical capital buffer. The 
regulations demand an advice each quarter. Norges Bank decided in 2012 to incorporate the 
analyses for the advice on the countercyclical capital buffer into the MPR. 
2.2 Monetary policy meeting 13 March 
At the March monetary policy meeting Norges Bank decided to keep policy rates unchanged, 
but lowered the forward interest rate path. In the monetary policy report published in March, 
Norges Bank commented that international financial markets had improved, but that the 
growth prospects for Norway’s trading partners had weakened. When it came to the 
Norwegian economy, growth prospects were adjusted downwards and inflation had once 
again been lower than anticipated. Still Norges Bank expected the output gap to be ½ per cent 
in both 2013 and 2014, higher than the estimated 0.3 per cent for 2012. 
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Chart 2.3 Norges Bank’s policy rate paths 
 
 
The main surprise in the report was a new understanding of the inflation process. Norges 
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particular importance for consumer prices. Previous analyses had concluded that inflation in 
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margins in the retail sectors. An implication of this was an expectation that inflation would 
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In sum, Norges Bank trimmed the interest rate path by up to 73 basis points. This was largely 
due to weaker outlook for inflation. The interest rate path also indicated a 40 per cent 
probability of a rate cut in the spring of 2013. 
This marked decline in the rate path came as a surprise to the markets and analysts. According 
to Reuters, none of the 10 surveyed had expected any changes in the policy rate at this 
meeting. Within March 2014, 5 out of 8 surveyed expected a rise to 1.75 per cent, 2 expected 
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unchanged at 1.50 per cent and 1 expected two 25 bps cuts to 1.00 per cent. The Norwegian 
krone depreciated by about 10 øre and the Jun 3m FRA fell 10 basis points after the meeting. 
According to Reuters 5 out of 8 surveyed expected the policy rate to be hiked 25 bps by the 
end of the first quarter 2014. The analysts were thus more dovish than the Norges Bank’s 
October MPR, but more hawkish than the new rate path in March. We do not have the full 
picture of how analysts reacted, but several probably adjusted their forecasts downwards. The 
main reason for this surprise was probably Norges Bank’s new insight into the inflation 
process and the effects of this on the rate path.  
Chart 2.4 Factors behind changes in the interest rate forecast 
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would lower the policy rate to below ½ per cent, 1 percentage point below the actual rate 
path. In the previous report this difference was ¾ percentage point. We presume that this gap 
may be interpreted as a measure of Norges Bank’s judgment concerning robustness and 
financial risks. It thus seems likely that Norges Bank put even more weight on robustness and 
financial risks in this report than in the October 2012 MPR. We comment further on the way 
in which Norges Bank takes account of financial risks in Section 3.2. 
Chart 2.5 Market reactions 
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However, the March 2013 MPR rate path had a relatively high probability for a rate cut, up to 
50 per cent depending on the interpretation of the path. Most factors pointed downwards; 
recession in the euro zone, falling interest rates abroad, core inflation was below expectations, 
and the wage negotiations indicated lower wage inflation. The Norwegian economy seemed to 
develop in line with Norges Banks’ expectations. The only important factor pulling rates up 
was a depreciation of the NOK. According to Reuters 3 out of 18 surveyed analysts expected 
a rate cut in May, the others expected unchanged rates. The market had priced in a small 
probability for a rate cut, and thus both the Norwegian krone and forward interest rates rose 
slightly after the meeting. 11 of the surveyed had forecasts for the rate decision in June, and 4 
of them expected rates to be lowered either in May or in June.  
2.4 Monetary policy meeting 19 June, with MPR 
The monetary policy decisions at the June monetary policy meeting were released 20 June, 
the day after the meeting. Also at this meeting the decision was to leave the interest rate 
unchanged and the executive board did not discuss alternatives. But the interest rate path was 
trimmed again, this time with 44 bps at the most. In the new path, the policy rates bottom at 
1.38 per cent in the two last quarters of 2013. This could be interpreted as the probability of a 
25 bps rate cut was the same as the probability of no change of the interest rate. The first rate 
hike seemed likely to take place in the autumn of 2014.  
The reasons for the downward revision were that Norges Bank had trimmed its estimates of 
capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy, and that more moderate wage growth than 
anticipated pulled the inflation outlook down even further. Higher loan spreads in the banks 
also contributed somewhat to lowering the interest rate path. A weaker NOK and somewhat 
stronger than expected inflation pulled in the direction of a higher interest rate path. "The 
analyses suggest that the key policy rate be kept lower than projected earlier. There are 
prospects that the key policy rate will remain at the current level, or somewhat lower, in the 
year ahead," Governor Olsen said in the press release.  
Even though Norges Bank had adjusted down the rate path, the growth rates for the Mainland 
GDP were lowered, the output gap was lowered and the inflation forecasts for 2015 and 2016 
were lowered. The output gaps were barely positive in 2014 and 2015, and turned slightly 
negative in 2016. Inflation rises slowly to 1.9 per cent by the end of 2016. 
These forecast revisions resemble the factors behind the changes in the interest rate forecast in 
the above graph, but they are not identical. Whereas the graph presents the impulses to the 
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forecasting model from the news since the preceding forecast, the forecast revisions reflect 
the impulse responses in the model, taking into account the changes to monetary policy that 
are implied by the impulses. 
Norges Bank’s model calculation of the rate path in a situation where the Bank only gave 
weight to the inflation gap and the output gap (criteria 1 and 2 in Norges Bank’s wording), 
gives a rate path that bottoms at 0.16 per cent. This alternative path is at the most 122 bps 
below the actual path. This indicates that Norges Bank had given even more weight to 
robustness and financial risks than it did in the March 2013 report. Norges Bank also made it 
clear that it wants the banks to build up a countercyclical capital buffer and planned to present 
concrete advice about the buffer when the regulation is in place, and assumed that would be in 
the next monetary policy report (released on 19 September).  
21 out of 22 surveyed analysts expected unchanged policy rate at the meeting according to 
Bloomberg. The market’s reaction was a pronounced depreciation of the Norwegian krone. 
EURNOK increased from 7.68 just before the announcement to 7.93 by the end of the day. 
The 3m DEC FRA dropped 9 bps for the day.  
Chart 2.6 Factors behind changes in the interest rate forecast 
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according to the latest statistics; the core inflation rate was 2.5 per cent. At the same time, the 
NOK had weakened noticeably since the previous monetary policy report. These two factors, 
which tend to carry considerable weight in the committee's assessments, would normally call 
for a higher interest rate path and an earlier rate hike. But other key economic indicators had 
weakened. “In its discussion of monetary policy, the Executive Board gave weight to the fact 
that inflation has been higher than expected and that the krone exchange rate has weakened, 
but that the driving forces of inflation remain moderate. Weight was also given to somewhat 
slower growth in the Norwegian economy and slightly lower-than-projected capacity 
utilisation. A rapid rise in the key policy rate may increase the risk of a more pronounced 
dampening of activity growth, an appreciation of the krone and too low inflation” Norges 
Bank stated in the September 2013 MPR. In addition, the central bank assumed that the rise in 
inflation was transitory and the estimated inflation rates in two to three years' time were thus 
only increased moderately. Nevertheless, Norges Bank slightly raised the interest rate path for 
the next two years. 
As noted in Section 4.2.1, we are somewhat critical of Norges Bank’s analysis of exchange-
rate movements. During 2013, the krone weakened repeatedly as news arrived about 
weakening of the economic outlook. It could thus be natural to interpret these movements as 
endogenous reactions to lowered interest-rate expectations. As such, they should not represent 
an independent influence on the rate path. Norges Bank, however, treated part of the krone 
weakening as the result of an exogenous exchange-rate shock because only part of the 
movement could apparently be explained by the parameters of the model. We believe this 
rather should have been an occasion to reconsider the relevant parameter values. 
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Chart 2.7 Factors behind changes in the interest rate forecast 
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In the previous reports the calculations of a rate path solely based on the inflation target 
(criteria 1) had given policy rates at zero for a certain time. In the September MPR the policy 
rates in such a path bottomed at 0.9 per cent. A rate path, also with weight to the output gap 
(criteria 1 and 2), now gave policy rates at 1.13 per cent at the lowest. The difference from the 
actual rate path was clearly smaller than in the previous report, with a spread at 50 bps at the 
most. The weight to robustness and financial risks seemed to have declined.  
According to Bloomberg, all of the 19 surveyed analysts expected the policy rate to be 
unchanged. The markets reacted to the decision by sending EURNOK down from 7.87 to 
roughly 7.82, but during the day the EURNOK recovered. 3m NOK FRAs fell a few bps for 
the nearest contracts. For contracts for 2014 the decline was more visible, and in contrast to 
rising EUR FRAs.  
October's monetary policy meeting was held 23 October, just five weeks after the meeting 
in September. Inflation in September was lower than Norges Bank had anticipated but the 
NOK depreciated more than expected. Norges Bank also pointed out that the rise in interest 
rates outside Norway had been pushed a bit further into the future and that household demand 
appeared to be a bit weaker than had previously been assumed. In addition, Norges Bank 
pointed out that housing prices had levelled out but the unemployment rate had remained 
relatively stable. The executive board thus found no grounds for changing the key policy rate 
and since this was an intermediary meeting that did not entail the preparation of a report, it 
was not necessary to take a stand with respect to future interest rate trends. At the press 
conference the Bank stated that no other options were discussed at the meeting. 
According to a Reuters survey, 13 out of 14 analysts expected unchanged policy rates. 
Furthermore, among the seven giving forecasts for policy rates by the end of 2014 the average 
forecast was 1.75 per cent. This indicates that the analysts had adopted Norges Bank’s interest 
rate signals. But the highest forecast was a policy rate at 2.00 per cent, and the lowest forecast 
was 1.00 per cent. This spread indicated large discrepancies in the view of the economy. The 
market reactions to this meeting were limited. The NOK ended the day a bit stronger versus 
the Euro, but the FRAs dropped a few basis points (also relative to EUR FRAs).  
2.6 Monetary policy meeting 4 December, with MPR 
A new monetary policy report, with a new interest rate path, was presented 4 December, the 
day after the monetary policy meeting. The NOK had weakened further in the autumn, and 
clearly more than Norges Bank had anticipated. Seen in isolation, this seemed to call for an 
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even higher interest rate path, as did slightly lower money market premiums, although in this 
case it was a matter of a few basis points.  
On the other hand, a number of factors again favoured a lower interest rate path. Norges Bank 
pointed out that the inflation rate was lower than expected, the economic growth outlook had 
weakened further and wage growth would be lower than had previously been assumed. The 
banks' loan spreads had increased a bit. International interest rate expectations had declined 
further and the activity level outside Norway was a bit lower than anticipated. Norges Bank 
thus came to the following conclusion: "The analyses imply that the key policy rate should be 
held at the current level in the period to summer 2015 and be increased gradually thereafter. 
The increase in the key policy rate is now forecast to occur one year later than projected in 
September". In the interest rate path, the key policy rate was unchanged at 1.50 per cent 
throughout 2014, passed 1.63 per cent in the second quarter 2015 and was not raised above 
1.75 per cent until the fourth quarter of the same year. Norges Bank was of the opinion that 
the depreciation of the NOK was temporary and thus expected it to strengthen going forward.  
This time Norges Bank lowered the growth forecast for the Mainland GDP in 2014 by ¾ 
percentage points. Norges Bank now assumed that the output gap would be 0 for 2013 and -½ 
per cent in 2014 and 2015 before slightly increasing to -0.3 per cent at the end of 2016. Also, 
core inflation forecasts were revised down in 2013 and 2014. Inflation was forecasted to stay 
at 2 per cent in 2014, 2015 and 2016. However, there was a small rising trend in the inflation 
forecasts with inflation reaching 2.22 per cent at the end of 2016. 
Chart 2.8 Factors behind changes in the interest rate forecast 
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Inflation below target is an argument for a low rate path. In the previous MPRs this 
consideration has been assessed against a positive output gap, although this gap has been 
almost closed in the previous report. In the December MPR however, both considerations 
implied a low rate path. The differences between the rate paths based on criteria 1 (inflation 
gap) and criteria 1 and 2 (output gap) were now very small, and model calculations based 
solely on these two criteria gave policy rate cut by 50 bps over the next quarters. The main 
reason to keep rates unchanged was still related to the robustness and financial risks. The 
difference between the rates based on inflation and output gaps and the actual rate path had 
widened a bit, and was now 54 bps at the most.  
In the monetary policy meeting in December, Norges Bank also gave the Ministry of Finance 
advice on the countercyclical capital buffer. Even though the advice itself was not disclosed to 
the public, the analyses were presented in the monetary policy report along the same lines as 
in earlier reports.  
2.7 Evaluation 
Norges Bank kept the policy rate unchanged in 2013. We note some issues related to these 
decisions. First, none of the rate decisions came as surprises. That should be commended as a 
consequence of transparency and predictability. However, the policy rate path was changed 
substantially during the year as a reflection of changes in the economic outlook. To some 
extents these changes surprised the markets. This indicates that the transparency and 
predictability may be less effective in influencing short and medium term expectations 
beyond the actual monetary policy meeting.  
Second, the policy rate has been kept unchanged despite all the changes in the economic 
outlook. Instead, the forecasts of future interest rates have been changed repeatedly, mostly in 
the direction of putting rate hikes further and further off into the future. This may lead one to 
suspect that Norges Bank has shifted from using the policy rate as its main monetary tool, 
towards using rate forecasts as its main policy instrument. We see a risk that outside observers 
perceive this as a sign of timidity regarding actual changes in the policy rate. 
Third, keeping policy rates unchanged despite all the economic changes may leave market 
participants with an exaggerated impression of how long the policy rate will remain 
unchanged at the current, rather low level even if the economic outlook improves. Norges 
Bank has expressed concerns that low interest rates over time may encourage excessive risk 
taking. Keeping the policy rates not only low but also seemingly unaffected of the changes in 
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the economic outlook, may add to this financial stability risk. We miss a discussion of this 
point in the MPRs. 
Alternatively, the decisions to keep the policy rate unchanged may indeed have been modified 
by fear of encouraging excessive risk taking if the policy rate were to be cut. The alternative 
rate forecasts, based solely on the standard criteria of flexible inflation targeting, suggests this 
interpretation. If so, we would have expected a clearer link to the term discouraging 
deviations from the long-term normal interest-rate level reflected in the last term of the 
algebraic loss function included in the first three MPRs of 2013. Subjective judgement may of 
course have overridden the demands of this mathematical formula. That we would find 
reasonable, if only the relationship between the judgement and the formula had been 
discussed in the MPR. Furthermore, with the implementation of the countercyclical capital 
buffer for banks, as well as other macroprudential instruments, we would have preferred rate 
decisions to be based mainly on the standard criteria of flexible inflation targeting. 
In each of the monetary policy reports Norges Bank presents an interest rate accounting 
displaying contributions to the changes in the policy rate forecasts from various variables. 
This display is informative about Norges Bank’s analyses and widely studied by analysts and 
market participants. A weakness in our view is that it gives an exaggerated impression of 
precision. The estimated effect from one variable to the interest rate path depends to a large 
extent on Norges Bank’s assessments. 
The MPRs also contain a policy rate path based only on the standard criteria for flexible 
inflation targeting. In each MPR last year, this alternative path was lower than the preferred 
one and included rate cuts, in one case more than one percentage point. The distance from the 
preferred rate path can serve as an estimate of the weight Norges Bank puts on robustness and 
financial stability risks. The reports reveal substantial changes in the spread between the 
preferred rate path and the alternative path and hence varying weights to financial risks. We 
miss a more explicit discussion of the changes in this weight between the reports, and also 
how these weights are being affected by the implementation of macroprudential regulatory 
measures.  
  
29
3. Inflation targeting and financial stability 
The standard theory of flexible inflation targeting, as developed, e.g. by Woodford (2003), 
ignores the financial sector altogether. Indeed, it can be formulated perfectly without even 
mentioning money in that the conduct of monetary policy in that model boils down to the 
determination of the short-term nominal interest rate as the central bank’s sole instrument. 
The global financial crisis naturally—and brutally—moved central banks’ focus back to 
money, credit, and the workings of the financial sector. Indeed, this crisis served as a stark 
reminder of the crucial role played by the financial sector in the modern economy. Central 
banks needed to reactivate their almost-forgotten role as lenders of last resort. Furthermore, 
questions started to be raised as to whether concerns about financial stability shouldn’t enter 
as a separate consideration also into the modern central bank’s standard task of setting short-
term interest rates. Some claimed, for example, that the crisis was the direct or indirect result 
of easy money, that is, low interest rates for a long time, which had encouraged the formation 
of financial bubbles. Some subsequent research has provided some support for this claim2. 
Norges Bank started mentioning such concerns as an argument against keeping interest rates 
too low or low for too long. These concerns seemed to have gained in prominence after the 
change of governor in 20113. In the Monetary Policy Report of March 2012, the Bank 
published a mathematical formulation of this concern in the form of an extra term in the loss 
function reflecting the deviation of the actual interest rates from a long-term equilibrium or 
normal rate, so that the complete loss function per period is specified as 
ܮ௧ ൌ ሺߨ௧ െ ߨ∗ሻଶ ൅ ߣሺݕ௧ െ ݕ௧∗ሻଶ ൅ ߛሺ݅௧ െ ݅௧ିଵሻଶ ൅ ߬ሺ݅௧ െ ݅௧∗ሻଶ. 
We are somewhat critical of this formulation, for two reasons. First, the link between the 
deviation from the normal rate and financial instability is far from clear.. Although it is true 
that low interest rates reduce the risk of existing loans and increase the risk of newly granted 
loans, the main indicators of financial fragility are credit growth and asset price increases. In 
any case, if the interest rate is to be considered, there is no reason to formulate it 
symmetrically in the form of the squared deviation, which suggests that an interest above 
normal should entail a risk of financial instability. Second, we do not view financial stability 
as a separate target in a fundamental sense. Financial crises are a problem because they tend 
to set off or deepen recessions and lower inflation. In other words, their importance to 
                                                 
2 Cúrdia and Woodford (2010), Gennaioli et al (2012), and others. 
3 See, for example, Governor Olsen’s Annual Address 2012 (Olsen, 2012). 
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monetary policy lie in their effects on the levels and volatility of the standard target variables 
of flexible inflation targeting, namely, the output gap and the deviation of inflation from 
target. Thus, the risk of financial instability should rather be formulated as an element of 
uncertainty in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy that may be triggered once 
some threshold (on interest rates, credit expansion, real estate price to income, or some other 
variable) is reached than as an additional target variable. 
It is our impression that Norges Bank basically shares this view and, like many other central 
banks, is seeking to expand its modelling of the financial sector for this purpose. We also 
have the impression that the Bank is seeking to downplay the mechanical nature of its loss 
function. For example, the mathematical function was omitted from the last three Monetary 
Policy Reports of 2013 after having been included in the first one as well as all three of the 
2012 Reports. We recommend that Norges Bank continue avoiding the reference to the 
analytical formulation that may give a misleading impression of precision, and communicate 
more explicitly to the public the overall concern regarding financial stability. Until risks to the 
financial system are modelled more rigorously as part of the transmission mechanism, we 
recommend that such concerns be handled less formally, i.e. as a matter of judgment. 
3.1 On the countercyclical buffer 
Monetary policy is not the only defence against financial disturbances, however, and not 
necessarily the most effective one. Traditionally, this has been the domain of prudential 
regulation. After the great financial crisis, focus has moved from the solidity of the individual 
institutions to the stability of the overall financial system. This has given rise to the term, 
macroprudential regulation. The Norwegian government has decided to implement the Basel 
III regulations, which seek to strengthen financial resilience by sharpening the requirements 
for capital adequacy and liquidity provision. Of particular importance from a macroprudential 
perspective are the capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer. Based on 
Norges Bank’s advice, the Ministry of Finance has decided to require banks to add a 1% 
countercyclical buffer from June 30, 2015. 
It is clear from the Basel III proposal and its implementation by the Norges Bank that the 
countercyclical “higher buffers may have a dampening impact on growth in total credit and 
GDP” 4 This is furthermore fully acknowledged by the Norges Bank from the statement that, 
“An increase in the buffer will primarily serve to enhance banking sector resilience and may 
                                                 
4 Norges Bank (2013a) documents their view, see esp. p. 8 Section 4, and also p. 27 of the December 2013 MPR. 
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in that respect help curb excessive fluctuations in the economy over time. There is reason to 
believe that stronger capital requirements will not give rise to considerable, permanent 
economic costs in the long term, see also Basel Committee (2010c).”5 
Nevertheless, in our conversations with representatives of Norway’s regulatory agencies and 
of the Ministry of Finance, it was unanimously expressed that the introduction of a 
countercyclical capital buffer will provide additional capital to cover losses and diminish the 
cost of required capital injection in a crisis, but that it would only marginally and temporarily 
affect credit growth. If this is indeed the consensus on the impact of the countercyclical 
buffer, it underestimates the impact of the countercyclical buffer on economic activity. 
The countercyclical buffer constitutes part of the arsenal of macroprudential instruments 
Norwegian regulatory authorities have at their disposal. As a recent instrument, it is only 
natural that the way to implement it and the conditions for its activation are carefully 
considered. The question is therefore to what extent it interacts with credit supply and, 
therefore, with monetary policy. In what follows we report our views on the way this 
instrument is intended to be implemented in Norway.  
We structure the discussion around three points. First, how the countercyclical buffer is 
expected to be triggered in Norway, second the empirical evidence on the impact on the 
economy of the additional equity requirement that it implies, and third the risks that are 
associated with setting in motion the buffer.  
3.1.1 Why a countercyclical buffer? 
The procyclicality of capital regulation, leading banks to reduce their lending precisely in a 
downturn, has been acknowledged for a long time. The introduction in December 2010 of two 
capital buffers in the so-called Basel III framework was aimed precisely at limiting the extent 
of this perverse effect. The first one, the 2.5% capital conservation buffer, is mandatory and is 
to be activated in normal times. In contrast, the countercyclical buffer is discretionary and is 
aimed at smoothing banks’ supply of credit, so that its implementation not only reinforces 
banks’ solvency, but also puts a break on excessive credit growth, a variable correlated with 
the probability of a systemic crisis. 
The reason why there are two buffers instead of one is that they have different objectives: In 
the countercyclical buffer the increase in banks’ solvency is only of secondary importance 
                                                 
5 Ibid 
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with respect to the rein in of excessive credit. This is clearly stated in the proposed trigger for 
the countercyclical buffer that is based on deviations from trend in the credit to GDP ratio. 
The countercyclical buffer aims at reducing the time dimension of systemic risk and does not 
discriminate among credit institutions depending on their asset risk characteristics. The way it 
is expected to operate is through banks reducing their supply of credit and increasing the 
interest rates on loans in good times, thus leading to a decrease in credit expansion, both from 
the supply and the demand side6.  
3.1.2 Implementation in Norway 
The implementation of a countercyclical buffer is a complex issue that in our opinion the 
Norwegian authorities have addressed successfully. 
The difficulty with the implementation of the countercyclical buffer comes from the short 
term electoral objective of the party in government when the decision is made. Indeed, by 
activating the countercyclical buffer, the government knows it will put a damper on economic 
growth. This reduction in growth, in turn, implies losing votes and therefore jeopardizing the 
governing party position in power. Since the countercyclical buffer is discretionary, if 
activated solely on the basis of the government decision, the political economy equilibrium is 
expected to be inefficient, with the countercyclical buffer being triggered only in extreme 
cases, when it is obvious that excessive growth of credit should be countered.  
In addition to reducing economic growth, implementing the countercyclical buffer may have a 
second effect in a world of cross-border banking. Indeed, the higher capital charges of 
domestic banks will limit the supply of credit by domestic banks, thus creating opportunities 
for foreign banks to expand their market share, an effect that may be irreversible and that will 
have a high political cost, as the government will be accused of hurting the domestic banking 
industry while facilitating the expansion of foreign banks. While, from the perspective of the 
efficient allocation of credit, the substitution of foreign bank lending for domestic one may 
help reduce the cost of the countercyclical buffer by providing credit to firms that would 
otherwise be rationed, it is clear that the government will take the blame. To reduce the 
competitive advantage of foreign banks, Norwegian authorities have the intention to 
coordinate with other countries so as to eliminate or, at least, reduce the impact of such 
substitution and prevent foreign banks from benefiting from the situation. This coordination 
                                                 
6 This reasoning is based on the fact that financial markets are imperfect, with equity being more costly than 
debt, so that the Modigliani-Miller proposition does not hold. 
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with foreign regulatory agencies implies that the political cost of implementing the buffer is 
mitigated, but that the effect on credit supply is stronger. 
The most creative and positive point in the way the implementation of the countercyclical 
buffer is intended to operate in Norway is that it is the joint responsibility of two institutions: 
Norges Bank and the Ministry of Finance. Norges Bank, which bears no cost of a reduced 
credit expansion and economic growth, will play first and produce a report stating that the 
conditions for implementing the countercyclical buffer have been reached. This will face the 
government with a recommendation to trigger the countercyclical buffer by the Norges Bank 
experts (that are not subject to an electoral agenda) and will force the government either to 
accept the suggestion to trigger the countercyclical mechanism or to find strong, credible 
economic reasons (other than the electoral strategy of whatever party is in office) why it is not 
in the public interest to activate it. The mechanism as it is designed provides the right 
incentives to open the debate in society at large by providing sufficient transparency of the 
decision in a framework of responsibility and accountability for the government that will 
reduce the inefficiency of the political economy equilibrium. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
Norges Bank recommendation can be kept secret until the Ministry follows the advice or 
rejects it, is an important limitation. Also, the implementation of the procedure may lead to a 
complex game of partial information disclosure through reports by the Norges Bank that may 
cause speculation and endogenous uncertainty. To some extent, the mechanism is reminiscent 
of the classical “checks and balances” that have proved successful in the U.S. political 
framework. 
As other central banks have started to implement a macroprudential policy, it is interesting to 
compare them. Of particular interest is the Bank of England policy where the whole 
organizational structure has been changed to accommodate the new macroprudential function 
of the newly created Financial Policy Committee and the Prudential Regulatory Authority. 
We fully support the view that an overarching approach that coordinates monetary and 
macroprudential policies is required. Whether this coordination is better achieved by creating 
separated committees or not is open to debate. Our perception is that the need of this 
coordination at Norges Bank has not been sufficiently taken into account. 
A second striking difference is the disclosure policy of the Financial Policy Committee, which 
seems to mirror the full disclosure of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee. As 
mentioned, it is important that these crucial decisions are based on well-defined criteria and 
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open to public debate, as otherwise politically important economic decisions are delegated to 
bodies that have not been elected. Nevertheless, it is not clear that the central banks have to 
provide a regular report, given that, contrary to monetary policy, macroprudential policy 
instruments will only be applied infrequently. 
3.1.3 Potential impact 
The countercyclical buffer, as defined in Basel III, is quite a new macroprudential instrument 
and, consequently, it is impossible to ascertain its impact on credit supply and real economic 
activity. Still, by analysing the impact of related macroprudential instruments that also impose 
higher capital or reserve requirements in good times, it is possible to approximate its potential 
impact. Nevertheless, as discussed later, the countercyclical buffer may have a different effect 
depending on, first, whether it is combined with other micro- and macroprudential 
instruments, second, on the state of the business cycle and, third, the state of the credit cycle. 
By construction, it is obvious that the capital ratio of financial institutions is increased in good 
times in order to be depleted in bad times. Nevertheless, this effect is also embedded in the 
capital conservation buffer. The key difference between the two is the impact on lending. As 
mentioned in point 136 of the Basel III framework7 concerning the countercyclical buffer, 
“Losses incurred in the banking sector can be extremely large when a downturn is preceded 
by a period of excess credit growth.” This may have different interpretations depending on 
whether the focus is on loss absorption or on reducing the excess credit growth, even if the 
countercyclical buffer will do both. Indeed, in point 137 of the same document, it is stated 
that, “It will be deployed by national jurisdictions when excess aggregate credit growth is 
judged to be associated with a build-up of system-wide risk to ensure the banking system has 
a buffer of capital to protect it against future potential losses.” So, the focus is not in limiting 
the negative effects of excessive credit growth and its impact on asset prices but on preparing 
to absorb losses in bad times. This is consistent with the view expressed by the Riksbank 
Study on the countercyclical buffer, which considers this impact of the buffer on excess credit 
growth as “a positive side-effect” and “a smoother supply of credit over the cycle” (Sveriges 
Riksbank, 2012). No matter what interpretation of the Basel III framework is preferred, the 
analysis of the countercyclical buffer impact has to focus the cost and availability of credit 
and to what extent it contributes to reduce excessive credit growth and possible asset price 
bubbles. 
                                                 
7 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011) 
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The empirical analysis of the impact of additional equity requirement during good times 
provides no definitive answer. Nevertheless, the bulk of evidence favours the existence of an 
impact of the countercyclical buffer on credit smoothing, which is precisely in line with the 
Basel committee reasons for putting it forward as part of Basel III framework. 
To begin with, it may be the case that there is no impact on credit. This is the conclusion 
drawn by Kraft and Galac (2011) on the basis of the Croatian experience of tightening capital 
and reserve requirements: Although it was effective in increasing the banks’ liquidity and 
capital buffers, helping Croatian banks to weather the global financial crisis, it was less 
effective in slowing credit growth and capital inflows. 
The opposite result is found in Poland, where capital requirements were raised in reaction to 
buoyant activity in credit markets through a recommendation of a quasi-regulatory nature in 
2006. This move was seen as having been effective in curbing the growth of foreign-currency-
denominated loans to households and in keeping the banking system resilient during the 
global financial crisis in 2007-08 (Kruszka and Kowalczyk, 2011).  
Contrasting with the Croatian case, the majority of contributions argue that a countercyclical 
capital buffer will have an impact in smoothing the supply of credit over the cycle. 
Nevertheless, this can take two different forms: It may provide larger buffers so that in a 
downturn banks are better equipped to lend and the extent of the credit crunch is reduced, or it 
may trim down lending when credit growth is excessive. This asymmetry is essential in order 
to understand the impact the activation of a countercyclical buffer will have on the conduct of 
monetary policy.  
A natural laboratory to study the impact of contingent capital requirements is the Spanish 
banking system where a countercyclical dynamic provisioning was implemented. As there has 
been a full credit cycle (2000-2013) to observe and detailed data on lending transactions, it is 
possible to disentangle credit demand and supply boom and bust. Jiménez et al. (2013) 
empirically analyse the impact of these provisions on credit supply and associated real effects. 
Dynamic provisions accumulate in good times and can then be used to cover the realized 
losses in bad times. The empirical analysis of Jimenez et al. shows that countercyclical 
dynamic provisioning smoothes cycles in the supply of credit and, in bad times, upholds firm 
financing and performance. Effects are strongest in crisis times. Nevertheless, dynamic 
provisioning did little to stop the credit boom to firms in good times as firms switched to less 
affected banks. Of course, the capital requirement for a high risk loan in the “standardized” 
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approach to dynamic provisioning was 1% (1.5% for credit cards); while with the 
countercyclical buffer it would be 2.5%. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether this higher 
coefficient would have sufficed to prevent the building of the credit boom and real estate 
bubble it caused. 
The evidence of Lim et al. (2011) also documents an effect of increased capital buffers on 
credit growth, but goes one step further. On the basis of a sample of 48 countries, from 2000 
to 2010, these authors show that dynamic provisioning has a negative impact on credit 
growth. So, contrasting with Jimenez et al. (2013), their result establishes an impact that is 
statistically significant.  
The United Kingdom, where regulators have imposed time-varying, bank-specific minimum 
capital requirements since Basel I, constitutes another experiment that allows approximating 
the impact of variable capital buffers. Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2012) examine this 
effect on the basis of micro evidence on UK banks. In the United Kingdom, capital 
requirements increase in good times, so the regulation comes close to the countercyclical 
buffer. Over the 1998-2007 period, the authors find that UK-regulated banks reduced lending 
in response to tighter capital requirements8. These results suggest that, on balance, changes in 
capital requirements can have a substantial impact on aggregate credit supply by UK-resident 
banks.  
It should be noticed that both the Spanish dynamic provisioning and the UK variable capital 
requirements constitute experiences where leakages were important, as foreign banks that 
were not subject to the domestic regulation could increase their market share at the expense of 
domestic banks. As mentioned, this has reduced the effect of the countercyclical buffer. The 
expected Norwegian agreements with other countries’ regulatory authorities should reduce the 
amount of such leakages. Consequently, the impact of countercyclical buffers is expected to 
be higher in Norway, provided the coordination with other regulatory authorities is successful 
and foreign banks do not simply expand at the cost of domestic ones. 
                                                 
8 But non UK-regulated banks (resident foreign branches) increased lending in response to tighter capital 
requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks. This ‘leakage’ was material although only partial: 
It offset by about one third the initial impulse from the regulatory change. 
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3.1.4 Potential problems 
Activating the countercyclical buffer may lead to additional difficulties, first, because it may 
take place at the wrong time in the credit cycle and, second, because other micro- or 
macroprudential measures may be in place to correct the same market imperfections.  
The first point is well documented by Repullo and Saurina (2012), who consider the 
relationship between the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio and the business cycle. Because 
of the existence of a negative correlation between the two variables in many countries, they 
argue that a mechanical application of the buffer would tend to reduce capital requirements 
when GDP growth is high and increase them when GDP growth is low, so it may end up 
exacerbating the inherent pro-cyclicality of risk-sensitive bank capital regulation.  
Second, it is to be noticed that Norway has put in place a loan-to-value (LTV) regulation that 
should reduce the excessive risk in the mortgage market and the possible associated real estate 
bubble. Thus, the issue of the combination of the countercyclical buffer with the existing 
instruments should be addressed. From a theoretical perspective, which instrument is 
preferred may depend upon the information available to bank managers and to regulatory 
authorities. As bank managers are more efficient in terms of micromanagement, if they have 
better information, the countercyclical buffer allows them to efficiently choose where to 
reduce their investment; if, instead, banks are myopically riding a bubble on the basis of 
incorrect internal risk models that disregard systemic risk while regulatory authorities have a 
better view on systemic risk, a focalized macroprudential instrument, such as LTV or DTI 
(debt to income), that in fact limits micromanagement, may perform much better. There is a 
clear impact of this type of instruments on credit growth, as established in Lim et al.(2011) 
with interesting empirical results that are shown in their table 1 reproduced in Appendix A to 
this chapter. 
Regarding the coordination with monetary policy a focalized macroprudential instrument will 
have a limited overall impact, possibly with negligible consequences on the conduct of 
monetary policy; on the contrary activating a countercyclical buffer might have a crucial 
macroeconomic impact and will imply adjusting monetary policy accordingly. 
Norwegian regulatory authorities seem to take for granted that activating the countercyclical 
buffer will have only a marginal or passing effect on credit growth. Yet, existing empirical 
results tend to show that this assertion is not well founded. Setting in motion the 
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countercyclical buffer has a cost (for borrowing firms) that is considered as negligible, which 
need not be the case. 
At the same time, there are clear uncertainties regarding the timing of the activation, whether 
it should be set on the basis of a deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio or on the basis of the 
business cycle. To complicate the issue, the use of focalized macroprudential instruments, 
such as LTV ratios, may make the countercyclical buffer redundant to cope with specific 
financial market imperfections. The conduct of monetary policy should definitely take all 
these aspects into account rather than simply assuming they are negligible. 
In particular, the use of macroprudential measures seems likely to reduce the need for interest 
rates to be set higher than what is appropriate from the conventional perspective of flexible 
inflation targeting9. Appendix 3A makes this point in the context of a simple mathematical 
model. Of course, macroprudential instruments may be imperfect in this regard. They may 
even have undesirable side effects to the extent that they dampen asset price increases that are 
driven by fundamentals rather than bubble tendencies. Yet, their presence reduces the need for 
rate setters to keep a separate eye on this concern. We thus recommend that Norges Bank 
return, at least to some extent, to its more traditional set of criteria for rate setting once the 
countercyclical buffer has been implemented. 
3.2 The importance of long-term price stability 
Monetary policy making is intimately tied to the understanding of the inflation process 
embedded in the modern Phillips curve, which may be specified as follows: 
ߨ௧ ൌ ߚߨ௧ାଵ௘ ൅ ߢሺݕ௧ െ ݕ௧∗ሻ ൅ ݁௧. 
The second term on the right specifies inflation as an increasing function of the output gap, 
meaning that demand pressure drives inflation upward in a booming economy whereas 
recession dampens inflation. In the early literature on the Phillips curve (Phillips 1958) this 
was the only relation examined. It was furthermore often interpreted as a policy menu in the 
sense of a permanent choice between real growth and price stability (e.g. Samuelson and 
Solow, 1960). 
Subsequent research (e.g. Phelps, 1967, Friedman, 1968) challenged this interpretation by 
claiming that expansionary policies would shift the Phillips curve upwards by raising 
inflationary expectations. Thus, the real benefits of expansionary policies would at best be 
                                                 
9 This point has been made, for example, by Goldman Sachs (2014) in their analysis of the Bank of England. 
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temporary and at worst non-existent. A large body of subsequent research, using a wide 
variety of models, has left very little doubt about the importance of expectations for the 
inflation process. Inflationary expectations breed inflation. Deflationary expectations breed 
deflation. The Japanese experience of the last two decades is the prime example of the latter. 
An important example of the former was probably the U.S. economy of the 1970s, when the 
Federal Reserve accommodated increases in energy prices by letting overall inflation rise, and 
two major recessions resulted, one when oil prices started to rise and one when monetary 
policy eventually was tightened. Long-term price stability—defined as adherence to the 
inflation target on average over time—requires confidence, that is, the agents in the economy 
must believe in it. If they don’t; for example, if they believe a rate cut will raise inflation 
rather than boost activity, a cut will succeed only in raising inflation and not in boosting 
activity. 
Much research has been directed towards the question of whether expectations are rational or 
not. A more relevant question in the present context is how central bank behaviour and 
communication influences expectations. In a short-run sense, the management of expectations 
is essential to successful monetary policy making in that the mere announcement of a policy 
rate rests on the assumption that agents expect this rate to remain in effect until the next 
scheduled policy meeting, as pointed out by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). These authors 
carry this idea further by emphasizing forward guidance as the central bank’s main instrument 
at the zero lower bound of interest rates. 
Chart 3.1 Norges Bank's CPI forecasts in various policy reports 
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Unfortunately, there is no simple prescription for a central bank to build and maintain such 
confidence. A necessary condition, however, would seem to be that the central bank 
demonstrates its intention to keep its inflation target by issuing inflation forecasts that reach, 
or at least approach the inflation target within the forecast horizon. Norges Bank’s three-year 
forecast horizon would seem long enough for this to be the case. As illustrated in the graph 
above, this was indeed the case in Monetary Policy Reports through June 2011. Subsequently, 
however, Norges Bank’s inflation forecasts have consistently ended up below target at the end 
of the forecast horizon. That would not have been a cause of concern if the forecasts also 
showed a positive output gap because flexible inflation targeting then calls for an 
overshooting of inflation. As shown in the graph below, however, this was not the case in the 
most recent report in that the output gap never returns to zero within the forecast horizon. The 
forecasts in the other Monetary Policy Reports after June 2011 have shown a similar pattern. 
In oral comments on this pattern, such as in the webcast press conferences, spokespersons for 
Norges Bank have sought to blunt criticism by stating that forecasted inflation approaches 
target even if it does not reach it within the forecast horizon. However, further movement 
towards target would normally require a positive output gap, which Norges Bank’s forecasts 
do not indicate. We also see no other likely force pushing inflation back towards target in 
Norges Bank’s forecasts beyond the horizon. 
This leaves us with the conclusion that Norges Bank is intentionally sacrificing price stability 
as well as full employment in the expectation that this will help safeguard against financial 
instability. As argued in the preceding section, we see good reasons for this in the absence of 
macroprudential regulation. With the implementation of the countercyclical buffer as well as 
the capital conservation buffer for banks, however, we are less convinced about its 
appropriateness. 
  
41
Chart 3.2 Norges Bank's forecasts for inflation and output gap Dec 2013 
 
 
Lars Svensson (2013a) has criticised Sweden’s Riksbank for having been excessively 
influenced by financial stability concerns with the result that jobs have been sacrificed and 
inflation kept below target. Svensson (2013b) adds that monetary tightening tends to make 
income rise slower than expected. With household debt being mainly determined by past 
lending decisions, households’ debt ratio would tend to rise, which in turn should increase the 
risk of financial instability rather than reducing it. 
We believe Svensson’s criticism of the Riksbank applies to Norges Bank as well. In addition, 
we fear that Norges Bank thus has undermined the confidence in long-term price stability for 
Norway, whereas Svensson concludes it has not been disturbed in the case of Sweden. 
As the graph suggests, we are not equally assured about the stability of inflationary 
expectations in Norway. True, expectations for inflation five years ahead have been centred 
around the target for the last two years; but expectations that far ahead reported to a survey 
may not be reliable. Expectations for inflation two years ahead clearly lie below target 
although they recovered a little in the second half of last year. A common element, however, 
is a pronounced downward shift in expectations just around the time when Norges Bank in 
2011 started to forecast inflation below target three years ahead in its Monetary Policy 
Reports. 
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Davis (2012) explores the consequences of changes in central bank credibility. They are not 
trivial. We find it premature to claim that Norges Bank has lost or is losing credibility as a 
flexible inflation targeter. But we believe the potential consequences of such a loss are serious 
enough for Norges Bank to start paying attention to the issue already now. 
Chart 3.3 Inflation expectations 
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Appendix A: The Effectiveness of Macroprudential Instruments in Reducing the Pro-
cyclicality of Credit 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Rate setting vs. macroprudential regulation of systemically risky behaviour 
 
This appendix considers this problem in a simple model with two periods and two assets. 
Households save in the first period—p period 1—to invest in the two assets, which give a 
return in period 2. One asset, ܭ, is completely safe. The other asset, ܪ, is perceived safe by 
households, but carries an external risk of financial instability. To keep the analysis simple, all 
variables are kept in real terms, and all prices are fully flexible. The usual tradeoff between 
unemployment and inflation, which stands at the centre of real-world monetary policy 
making, thus does not arise. The problem of picking the right nominal interest rate for the 
flexible inflation target is replaced by the simpler one of choosing the right after-tax real 
interest rate, where the tax ݐ is levied on both assets equally, so as to give household-firms the 
optimal incentives to save and invest. This is exactly analogous to the problem of setting the 
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nominal interest rates at just the right level for the Euler equations in the neo-Keynesian 
model to drive the output gap to zero. 
Differentiated tax rates for the two assets are not feasible in the present model. However, 
macroprudential supervision is approximated by a separate tax at rate  on investment in the 
risky asset, over and above the common tax rate. 
The representative household-firm makes investment decisions as follows: 
  max௄,ு ܷ ൌ ݑሺܥଵሻ ൅ ߚܧݑሺܥଶሻ 
subject to 
   ܥଵ ൌ ଵܻ െ ܭ െ ܪ ൅ ܶ 
   ܥଶ ൌ ݂ሺܭሻ െ ݐܭ ൅ ݃ሺܪ, ܪሻ െ ሺݐ ൅ ߬ሻܪ. 
Here, ଵܻ is an endowment of first-period goods, which can be consumed or exchanged 
costlessly at unit price into investment in either of the two assets, and ܶ is a lump-sum 
transfer of the government’s tax revenue. The function ݂ is assumed to be increasing and 
concave, so that ݂ᇱ ൐ 0 and ݂" ൏ 0. The same is true of the function ݃ as perceived by private 
agents, that is ݃ଵ ൐ 0 and ଵ݃ଵ ൏ 0, where the subscripts 1 refer to partial derivatives with 
respect to the first argument. ଵ݃and ଵ݃ଵ are furthermore treated as non-stochastic. The second 
argument in the function ݃ reflects the risk of financial instability, external to households. The 
first-order conditions for market equilibrium are thus 
(1)   െݑଵᇱ ൅ ߚሺ݂ᇱ െ ݐሻܧݑଶᇱ ൌ 0 
(2)   െݑଵᇱ ൅ ߚሺ݃ଵ െ ݐ െ ߬ሻܧݑଶᇱ ൌ 0 
Welfare analysis needs to take these conditions into account as well as the external risk 
associated with investment in ܪ. This risk is captured by the partial derivative ݃ଶ, which is 
assumed stochastic with expectation zero. Then, using this condition as well as (1) and (2), we 
find 
(3)   ߲ܹ ߲ܭ⁄ ൌ െݑଵᇱ ൅ ߚ݂ᇱܧݑଶᇱ ൌ ߚݐܧݑଶᇱ  
(4)   ߲ܹ ߲ܪ⁄ ൌ െݑଵᇱ ൅ ߚ݃ଵܧݑଶᇱ ൅ ߚܧሺݑଶᇱ ݃ଶሻ ൌ ߚሺݐ ൅ ߬ െ ݌ሻܧݑଶᇱ , 
where 
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(5)    ݌ ൌ െܿ݋ݒሺݑଶᇱ , ݃ଶሻ ܧݑଶᇱ⁄ ൐ 0 
Is the social risk premium for investing in the risky asset ܪ. 
From these conditions, we see immediately that the first-best optimal policy is to set ߬ ൌ ݌ 
and ݐ ൌ 0. Translated to the real world, this means that the systemic risk should be handled 
with macroprudential regulation only and that considerations of such risks should not 
influence rate-setting decisions. 
This solution may not be feasible, however. It may not be possible to tailor financial 
regulations so as to perfectly protect against systemic risk in the above sense. We therefore 
also look at the second-best problem of choosing the optimal value of ݐ for a given ߬. We then 
note that 
߲ܹ
߲ݐ ൌ ൬
߲ܹ
߲ܭ൰
߲ܭ
߲ݐ ൅ ൬
߲ܹ
߲ܪ൰
߲ܪ
߲ݐ ൌ ቈ
߲ܹ
߲ܭ ൅ ቆ
߲ܪ ߲ݐ⁄
߲ܭ ߲ݐ⁄ ቇ
߲ܹ
߲ܪ቉
߲ܭ
߲ݐ  
The effects of a change in ݐ on the equilibrium values of ܭ and ܪ follow from implicit 
differentiation of (1) and (2) and simplifies as 
߲ܪ ߲ݐ⁄
߲ܭ ߲ݐ⁄ ൌ ݂" ଵ݃ଵ⁄ ൐ 0. 
Substituting this into the formula above, we obtain 
(6)   ߲ܹ ߲ݐ⁄ ൌ ߚܧݑଶᇱ ሺ߲ܭ ߲ݐ⁄ ሻሾሺ1 ൅ ݂" ଵ݃ଵ⁄ ሻݐ ൅ ߬ െ ݌ሿ. 
Equating this expression to zero, we obtain the second-best optimal tax rate as 
(7)    ݐ ൌ ሺ݌ െ ߬ሻ ሺ1 ൅ ݂" ଵ݃ଵ⁄ ሻ⁄ . 
Thus, if ߬ ൏ ݌, the optimal tax is positive, but less than the difference between ߬ and its 
optimal value ݌. In particular, in the complete absence of macroprudential regulation, that is, 
if ߬ ൌ 0, the tax rate should be positive, but less than the value that would mimic the optimal 
regulation if applied to ܪ only. In other words, 
(8)    0 ൑ ݐ ൏ ݌ 
when ߬ ൌ 0. 
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Applied to the real world, this means that there is a second-best case for keeping interest rates 
above the level needed for flexible inflation targeting only. However, the flexible inflation 
target should not be ignored, but weighed against the concern for systemic risks. The better 
the macroprudential regulation, the less weight should be put on systemic risk factors in rate-
setting decisions. 
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4. Analysis and communication 
Inflation targeting is demanding in the sense that it depends on thorough and reliable analysis, 
especially structural modelling and forecasting. The effects of inflation-targeting monetary 
policy moreover depend on agents’ understanding of the arguments behind and the intended 
effects of monetary policy actions. The same is true for the general legitimacy of this policy, 
which is a requirement for it to work as part of a stable, democratic system over time. This 
preliminary point is extremely important for the well-functioning of financial markets and 
institutions. When the conduct of monetary policy is well understood through a good 
communication policy and is fully predictable as a reaction to exogenous shocks, all 
unnecessary uncertainty associated with interest rate changes is eradicated, leading to more 
efficient financial markets. In other words, no matter what monetary policy is, it should be 
implemented in such a way as to avoid creating additional uncertainty. In its monetary policy 
analysis, Norges Bank relies on a set of models as well as a varying set of exogenous 
assumptions. Professional judgement supplements the model analysis and also forms the basis 
underlying the formal modelling work. This is how it should be. 
Norges Bank’s main tool for communicating its analyses to the public is its regularly 
published Monetary Policy Report (MPR), last year expanded from three to four times a year. 
We applaud the extensive effort that goes into the publication of these reports. However, we 
also want to take this opportunity to comment on some issues regarding Norges Bank’s 
analysis and communication. 
4.1 Areas of analysis worth strengthening 
The dynamic, stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) model NEMO forms the centrepiece of 
Norges Bank’s modelling apparatus. NEMO’s structure follows the lines of the standard neo-
Keynesian models of closed economies with sticky prices and wages, as presented, for 
example, by Woodford (2003).  
4.1.1 Small, open economy 
Helpful as these models may be for the basic understanding of the rationale for flexible 
inflation targeting, they typically ignore elements that are important for understanding the 
workings of small, open economies, for which Norway is a prime example. 
Norges Bank has naturally been aware of this issue from the inception of its application of 
flexible inflation targeting. Thus, it was an important premise for the development of the core 
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model NEMO in 2003 that it be relevant for a small, open economy10. We nevertheless feel a 
need for a more thorough treatment of the various international linkages facing a small, open 
economy—especially one with a large natural-resource sector and extensive linkages to global 
financial markets—than we have found in Norges Bank’s model apparatus as well as the 
papers published by the Bank’s research staff. We are aware, however, that a major research 
project on monetary policy in small, open economies has been launched in the Bank. We 
applaud this initiative and would like to present some reflections on the topics that should be 
addressed in that project. 
What is missing in the closed-economy models is naturally the interactions with the rest of the 
world in general and the exchange rate in particular. Although we do not recommend a return 
to exchange-rate targeting, the exchange rate represents an important transmission channel for 
monetary policy changes by affecting wages and other production costs as well as the prices 
of imported and exported goods. 
We thus believe that the adaptation of a closed-economy modelling structure to the analysis of 
the Norwegian economy is not trivial. It raises fundamental questions about the role of the 
foreign trade, the terms of trade, the nominal exchange rate, and international financial 
markets. The openness of the economy breaks the link between prices and domestic 
production costs found in closed-economy models. To an external observer, it is not at all 
clear why the closed economy model has been chosen to instrument the monetary policy in an 
open economy and stretching the model to accommodate the currency shocks appears as a 
Procrustean bed. 
This adaptation of a model designed for a different economic environment raises fundamental 
questions about the nature of the inflation process in an open economy. For example, the 
central bank needs to be able to cope with situations where a loss of external confidence 
(generated, say, by a sudden reversal in capital inflows and outflows, a reasonable scenario 
given the crucial role of oil prices for the Norway economy) raises the prices of imported 
goods because the currency weakens even though the output gap may widen (negatively) at 
the same time. Thus, consumer inflation and the output gap may sometimes be negatively 
correlated. 
The fundamental questions concern not only the nature of the inflation process but also more 
fundamentally how we should understand the nature of inflation in the open economy, and on 
                                                 
10 Brubakk et al. (2006) 
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what measure of inflation the central bank should focus its attention. Whereas the standard 
closed-economy model naturally singles out an aggregate of consumer prices (such as the 
CPI) as the relevant measure of inflation, this is no longer obvious in the context of 
international interactions. In the neo-Keynesian model, the main argument for inflation 
targeting is to avoid the distortions caused by price and wage stickiness; and the idea is to use 
variations in the nominal interest rates to bring the marginal cost of production in line with the 
sticky prices so as to smooth out such distortions. For an open economy, it is not obvious that 
the consumer prices of imported goods are sticky in the same way as the prices of 
domestically produced goods and services. The marginal cost of imported consumer goods 
may also be less readily controllable by the central bank. For these reasons, Norges Bank 
Watch 200711 suggested that Norges Bank explore the alternative of targeting the CPI 
component for domestically produced goods and services only (adjusted for energy price and 
indirect tax changes) as an alternative to the entire CPI adjusted for the same items (CPI-
ATE). 
A more thorough approach would be to undertake a detailed study of the price setting along 
the entire production line for imported consumer goods from the border price in foreign 
currency to the price faced by the consumer. This line naturally contains some of the same 
elements as that of domestically produced goods and services because a substantial amount of 
domestic input goes into the distribution of goods from importers to retailers. It is 
nevertheless different because of the reliance on foreign suppliers and the special uncertainty 
caused by exchange-rate movements. 
Such an analysis could easily prove costly and quickly run into problems of data limitations. 
We therefore hesitate to recommend going into this material in full detail. However, the main 
elements determining costs and price setting along this value chain should be worth looking 
into. 
Neither alternative tells us anything about the pricing of exports, however. To take this into 
account, one would have to look at a GDP-based price index such as the GDP deflator. The 
deflator for the entire Norwegian GDP would naturally be dominated by the international 
prices for oil and gas, adjusted for exchange-rate movements. The corresponding deflator for 
the mainland economy could therefore be more informative about the nominal development 
of goods and services produced in Norway. In the standard neo-Keynesian model for a closed 
                                                 
11 Goodfriend et al. (2007) 
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economy without capital, all goods produced are also consumed, so that all potential 
distortions due to price stickiness show up in the CPI. For an open economy with capital this 
is no longer obvious because sticky prices could cause distortions in production that don’t 
show up in consumption. 
4.1.2 The labour market 
Wage formation is an important part of the transmission mechanism for monetary policy. 
Wages are the key ingredient of marginal production costs (at least for domestically produced 
goods and services), which in turn move prices in competitive as well as less-competitive 
markets. Wage formation is, however, an order of magnitude more complex than price 
formation. This is especially true of the Scandinavian labour markets, of which the Norwegian 
market is a prime example. The complications caused by wage stickiness and wage 
bargaining have been studied extensively in the literature12. The Scandinavian model adds 
another layer of complications by being a joint result of collective bargaining, usually on the 
national level, and local as well as individual adjustments. Collective bargaining has also been 
studied extensively, by sociologists as well as economists13. A key issue has been the role of 
collective bargaining in generating or avoiding unemployment hysteresis14. Some contributors 
to this literature claim that nation-wide bargaining with centralised unions is superior to 
industry-wide bargaining with decentralised unions because centralised unions tend to 
internalise the effects of wage changes on overall employment. This has been an important 
argument behind the consistent support provided by varying Norwegian governments to 
centralised bargaining assisted by a national mediator. A tripartite agreement about wage 
moderation was widely credited for the substantial decline in unemployment following the 
long recession of 1986 – 93. 
An important ingredient in the Norwegian bargaining system has been the custom of letting 
the manufacturing industries bargain first because they are the ones most exposed to foreign 
competition. This procedure, sometimes referred to as the wage-leader model (Norwegian: 
frontfagsmodellen), fully acknowledges the openness of the Norway economy. The raises 
agreed upon for the wage leaders are then supposed to serve as a guideline for the remaining 
sectors, private as well as public, to make sure that the traded-goods sector is shielded against 
foreign as well as domestic competition in the labour market. After a prolonged strike among 
                                                 
12 Recent examples include Blanchard and Galí (2007) and Gertler et al. (2008). 
13 For example, Katz (1993), Stokke (1998), and Døvik and Stokke (1999). 
14 Calmfors and Driffil (1988). 
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public-sector workers in 2012, a commission15 led by professor Steinar Holden of the 
University of Oslo (commonly referred to as Holden III) was asked to consider whether this 
experience called for a revision of the wage-leader model. In particular, the commission was 
asked to consider whether the oil-supplier industry should be taken out of the wage-leading 
group  as a way to dampen pressures for wage increases, which were viewed as detrimental to 
the traditional, not oil-oriented manufacturing industries. Although the commission did not 
favour this change, it did recommend some other modifications to make the model more 
suitable for the eventual transition away from the current dominance of oil and gas business in 
the Norwegian economy. 
Another particular feature of the Norwegian bargaining system is its biannual rhythm. A full 
contract renegotiation is undertaken in even-numbered years and the results approved by 
membership vote. In odd-numbered years, only wages are considered and final decisions 
made by the bargaining teams. Strikes may result in both cases, however. 
Even with this emphasis on collective bargaining, that is obviously not the end of the story. 
On average, about as much as one half of private-sector wage increases since 2000 have been 
classified as wage drift16, that is, as wage movements over and above the centralised, 
collective agreements. An important part of wage drift is the result of local, yet collective 
adjustments on top of the centralised agreements. The rest are individual adjustments, 
reclassifications, bonuses, and so on. 
This system has been challenged in recent years by the substantial inflow of foreign workers. 
In addition to the regular flow of political asylants, large numbers of workers have arrived 
from Eastern Europe after the eastward extension of the European Union. This development 
has given rise to a number of conflicts and accusations of social dumping. For a number of 
sectors, the government has yielded to union demands that all employees be paid the union 
wage. Legal requirements that all workers in a given sector be paid union wages may have 
prevented short-term effects on wage levels. However, the same measures exacerbate, if 
anything, the resulting increase in labour supply. A number of analysts, some of whom at 
Norges Bank17, have thus claimed that Norwegian wage inflation would have been even 
higher in recent years without this inflow, especially in the construction industry. 
                                                 
15Norwegian Ministry of Finance (2013) 
16 Norwegian Ministry of Labour (various issues) 
17 Nordbø (2013) 
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The Norwegian labour market thus appears to be quite complex. From one perspective, it may 
seem organised in an ideal way in that centralised collective bargaining takes care of 
macroeconomic balances while local and individual adjustments add microeconomic 
efficiency. Public opinion appears to agree with this view in that there seems little pressure, 
from any quarters, to seek radical changes. Thus, the recent Holden III report, referred to 
above, did not propose any major changes. 
Such a consensus does not mean that the system will work well if put under new pressure, 
however, as already noted by Holden III. Making a judgement of performance under stress 
requires a better understanding of how the various parts of this system interact. Given its 
importance for inflation and macroeconomic equilibrium, such an understanding should be at 
the top of the central bank’s agenda. As far as we have been able to ascertain, however, the 
treatment of the labour market in the various models used is quite rudimentary. We strongly 
suggest that a much more comprehensive investigation of the labour market be given very 
high priority in the recently started research project on monetary policy in small, open 
economies. 
Because of the apparent combination of collective and individual elements in the actual wage 
formation process, this analysis will need to combine elements of competitive and 
monopolistic equilibrium with searching-and-matching theory as well as behavioural models 
of collective behaviour. More specific questions would need to be raised about whether union 
contract wages are allocative18 and whether (because of the biannual rhythm) wages should be 
expected to rise faster in even-numbered than odd-numbered years.  
Proper labour market analysis requires proper data. The Norwegian labour market data are not 
good enough. The registration data for unemployment are timely and unburdened by the 
volatility of survey data, but incomplete because many unemployed choose not to register 
with the Labour and Welfare Service (NAV). The ILO-compatible Labour Market Survey 
(AKU) is based on too small a sample to allow proper monthly data; even the three-month 
moving averages that are published are highly volatile. Furthermore, the AKU data cover only 
workers with permanent residence in Norway and provides no wage information. The 
quarterly national accounts (KNR) offer more complete employment data, including on 
foreign workers, but are not very timely. A monthly establishment survey, covering wages as 
                                                 
18 Barro (1977) 
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well as employment, should be added to the AKU survey, and both surveys should use 
sufficiently large samples to provide meaningful and timely monthly information. 
4.1.3 Oil and gas 
Norges Bank’s analyses naturally recognize the importance of the oil and gas business to the 
Norwegian economy. However, the build-up of in-house expertise in this area has been 
insufficient. It contrasts, for example, the active energy-economics group at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas although the energy sector is, if anything, more important to the 
Norwegian economy than to that of the Dallas Fed district. The importance of this sector is 
not limited to the activities on the Norwegian shelf as the Norwegian oil service and oil 
supplier companies have become important global players. 
It is of course reasonable to treat the world oil market, and hence the price of oil, as 
exogenous to the Norwegian oil sector and the Norwegian economy. That conclusion does 
not, however, subtract from the importance of a proper understanding of the world oil market, 
including forecasts of the world price of oil as well as structural analysis of world oil demand 
and supply. New developments in energy markets, such as shale oil and gas, and also 
renewable energy, may represent threats to the balance of the Norwegian economy. The same 
is true of energy and environmental policy changes in key world markets. 
Norges Bank also treats petroleum investments as an exogenous variable in its analyses. This 
we find more surprising because these decisions are influenced by local costs and policies as 
well as prices, geology, and technology.  
Finally, we would like to see a more careful analysis of the effects of the oil and gas activities 
on the mainland economy. Preliminary research in this area suggests that these effects may 
have been more comprehensive than previously thought19. They may also have been 
qualitatively different in that the profitability of the mainland firms may have benefitted from 
a local monopoly power vis-à-vis the Norwegian shelf20. By driving up the value marginal 
product, this development has arguably been a major force behind the high Norwegian wage 
inflation of recent years. When an increase in local monopoly power raises average 
Norwegian output prices relatively to those of trading partners, this can technically be labelled 
a terms-of-trade effect. However, such a labelling can leave the impression that the causes 
may have been exogenous to the Norwegian economy, which is not obvious. 
                                                 
19 Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2013) 
20 Mork (2013) 
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4.1.4 The financial system 
Up until the global financial crisis, mainstream neo-Keynesian analysts, exemplified by 
Woodford (2003), studied monetary policy making as setting a policy rate only, without much 
further concern about money as such. An important lesson of this crisis was, however, that the 
functioning or malfunctioning of the monetary and financial system sometimes plays an 
important role. Namely, the crisis has brought to attention the importance of liquidity, the 
change in the liquidity of some assets (ABS, CDOs, and others sometimes referred to as 
“toxic assets”), the possible gridlock of the interbank market that have nowadays to be 
acknowledged by every central bank.  
Although this role becomes especially apparent during crises, proper crisis management 
naturally requires a general understanding of this system. It falls under the central bank’s 
responsibility as lender of last resort. We believe this responsibility goes beyond the task that 
Norges Bank shares with the FSA and the Ministry of Finance regarding financial stability. 
During the crisis, these institutions had to learn to “think out of the box” and now can draw 
the lessons and put in place the mechanisms required to maintain financial stability. We 
discussed that task in Chapter 3, including the relationship and the tradeoffs between 
financial-stability management and flexible inflation targeting. Although Norges Bank has 
published several studies on various aspects of the Norwegian financial markets, we would 
welcome a strengthening of research in this area. 
The recent crisis has shown the central role of shadow banking. Consequently, this has led 
monetary authorities to be concerned with the financial system, a somewhat nebulous 
concept. The financial system also encompasses a very heterogeneous conglomerate of 
markets from the stock market to overnight interbank transactions. It also includes a variety of 
institutions, which become tied to each other in a complex network of transactions and market 
positions. This issue of interconnectedness has become a key ingredient in the understanding 
of modern financial crises (Gai et al, 2011). 
To the extent that central banks thought about these issues before the crisis, it was considered 
sufficient to focus solely on credit and liquidity. Inside money is an important concept in this 
regard. Traditionally, it is defined as bank deposits that can be used as payment. Recent 
innovations have, however, created a number of near-money instruments that, although they 
may not be used for payment directly, have become important substitutes for bank accounts in 
the cash management of business companies. So, the frontiers between money and these 
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instruments have become blurred. The creation of such instruments, the services they provide, 
their performance under varying conditions, the interconnectedness they help create, and their 
robustness under stress in the Norwegian economy are important to understand for their 
proper regulation as well as for effective crisis management. 
A large body of international research in this area has been built up in the wake of the global 
financial crisis, exemplified by Brunnermeier et al (2009), Acharya et al (2009) and others, 
much of it building on the earlier works of Holmström and Tirole (1993) and Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997). Bernanke and Gertler (1996) looked at the macroeconomic role of financial 
markets in the form of a financial accelerator. That is, they looked at the financial markets as 
a complicating part of the transmission mechanism for shocks arising in the real economy. 
However, the experience of the global financial crisis suggests that shocks originating in the 
financial sector may on occasion have even larger macroeconomic effects. This insight 
underscores the need for studying the broader role of credit and liquidity. 
The Norwegian financial markets are naturally closely linked with the global markets via 
cross-border transactions as well as the presence of foreign financial institutions in Norway. 
These links are, at least in part, accounted for in the capital account of the balance of 
payments. Concerns about the balance of payments are naturally less important with a floating 
exchange rate and an open capital account than in a fixed-exchange-rate regime with capital 
controls. However, in periods of financial instability, cross-border debtor-creditor 
relationships may become relevant. We thus recommend that more careful monitoring of the 
balance of payments be studied, perhaps as part of the open-economy research project. If 
nothing else, this could be viewed as part of the preparation for the management of the 
Norwegian economy after the petroleum age. Again, because Norway is an open economy, 
the current account also deserves some more attention than Norges Bank currently gives it. 
Large and persistent current-account deficits can be important indicators of imbalances that 
imply risks of disruptive future corrections. At the current level of oil and gas exports, such 
concerns may seem remote for Norway, although a sudden fall in oil prices could quickly 
change this. Regardless, this surplus situation will ultimately prove temporary. It is even 
conceivable that the overall surplus picture may potentially hide underlying reasons for future 
concern. 
A special issue regarding credit and liquidity concerns the organisation of the NIBOR market 
for unsecured interbank credit. This is not really a market in Norwegian kroner, but rather a 
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market of currency swaps in that the borrowing is done in the eurodollar market and each loan 
subsequently swapped into Norwegian kroner. The participating banks have arrived at this 
arrangement in order to make use of the deeper liquidity in the eurodollar market. Some 
members of our team view the efficiency of this market as depending on the validity of 
covered interest parity (CIP). When CIP fails, such as during the global financial crisis21, the 
NIBOR curve can become very steep22. This steepness becomes an impediment to the 
transmission of monetary policy. As a prime example of interconnectedness, the dependency 
on CIP can also be viewed as a source of market inefficiency in times of crisis.  
In 2010, Norges Bank decided to cap the deposits that banks could make at the overnight 
(policy) rate in order to incentivize banks to redistribute reserves within the banking system. 
Because this decision amounted to an incentive for banks to become more interconnected, we 
are not necessarily convinced about its appropriateness23. However, we applaud Norges 
Bank’s subsequent step of organising a proper overnight (NOWA) market for Norwegian 
kroner in 2011. Recently, the NIBOR market has been simplified so as to only include 
maturities up to 6 months. We would see clear benefit, especially in times of crisis, of having 
a proper krone market for the same maturities. Previous attempts by the private banks to 
organise such a market have floundered because of the advantage of going via the deeper 
eurodollar market in normal times. However, the private banks’ attitudes may have been 
influenced by an expectation that Norges Bank would intervene with extraordinary measures 
in times of crisis, at a cost that the private banks would not bear. 
Another view on the NIBOR market is that the quoted rates to a large extent reflect the actual 
market pricing of unsecured lending. As NIBOR is quoted today it can be seen as reflecting 
yields on alternative investments given funding via the dollar market at various maturities. As 
these quotes reflect market prices, the economic agents easily see the actual cost of unsecured 
capital. According to this argument, the sharp rise in unsecured rates should not be viewed as 
an anomaly in times of crisis because risk premia then naturally rise. NIBOR is important as a 
set of benchmark rates, but the NIBOR market plays only a minor role in terms of bank 
funding except for very short maturities, which also are handled in the new overnight market. 
Funding at maturities beyond one to two weeks is rather handled in the repo market and for 
longer maturities in the bond market. 
                                                 
21 Coffey et al. (2009) 
22 Syed and Lilleås (2010). See also Bernhardsen et al. (2012) 
23 See also Bernhardsen and Kloster (2010) 
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In letters to the FSA and Finance Norway during 2013, Norges Bank expressed its preference 
for a purely krone interbank market to be organised24. One of the obstacles turns out to be the 
fact, just mentioned, that interbank transactions in maturities beyond one week tend to be 
collateralised.  
We recognize that the choice of organisation for the NIBOR market is far from trivial. 
However, we would recommend that Norges Bank continue to carefully study this issue in 
view of the crucial role played by CIP, why CIP failed during the financial crisis, and whether 
other institutional arrangements focusing directly on the possible arbitrages could be possible. 
Such a study should also consider the potential moral hazard involved if indeed the current 
organisation rests on an implicit expectation of costly government intervention in case of 
crisis. 
We naturally recognise that the central bank cannot on its own create a market for unsecured 
interbank loans. However, we recommend that Norges Bank continue to study the prospects 
for better incentivizing the banks to organise it on their own. On the other hand, because we 
are aware of the costs as well as the benefits of such a change, we certainly recommend that 
Norges Bank carefully weigh the various costs and benefits against each other. 
4.2 Communication 
Norges Bank’s main communication channel is the Monetary Policy Report (MPR), whose 
frequency recently has been increased from three times to four times annually. For policy 
meetings between MPRs, the press release is accompanied by a one- or two-page note titled, 
“The Executive Board’s policy decision—background and general assessment.” This is a 
much shorter summary of recent economic developments, with indications for each 
development as to whether it indicates monetary easing or tightening, respectively. The 
statement concludes with the Board’s conclusion. 
4.2.1 Exaggerated impression of precision 
The MPRs go beyond a mere listing of recent developments to put them into an analytical 
framework. Although the discussion in the MPRs now seem less closely tied to formal models 
than in recent years, the general philosophy underlying DSGE modelling is quite apparent. 
This becomes especially clear in the section, included in every MPR, that translates economic 
news into exogenous shocks. 
                                                 
24 Norges Bank (2013a, b) 
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This translation is far from trivial and involves a substantial amount of judgment because the 
relationship between model shocks and real-world data is far from one-to-one. Furthermore, 
the analysts—and ultimately the board—need to make a judgment as to the persistence of 
each perceived shock. Although past experience helps this judgment, subjective calls are 
unavoidable. 
Once the shocks and their persistence are determined, their effects on the optimal policy rate 
path can be derived. Importantly, the MPR decomposes these effects into the contributions by 
each major shock, in the form of so-called interest-rate accounting. Although the labelling of 
shocks can vary from report to report, they typically include factors like the following: 
 Foreign interest rates and interest-rate expectations 
 Shocks to the exchange rate (over and above the effects of changed interest-rate 
expectations) 
 Domestic costs (mainly wages) 
 Domestic prices (mainly markup shocks) 
 Foreign demand shocks 
 Domestic demand shocks (capacity utilization, i.e. the output gap) 
Shocks to interest-rate spreads and banks’ interest-rate margins are sometimes added. 
External analysts, especially in financial institutions, follow this interest-rate accounting 
eagerly. They also seek to emulate Norges Bank’s analysis by running their own interest-rate 
accounting ahead of each MPR and thus provide their clients with forecasts of the central 
bank’s forecasts. In Chapter 2, we presented the interest-rate accounting exercises presented 
in the various MPRs of 2013.  
Even though the MPR discussion during 2013 was not quite as openly tied to the DSGE 
modelling as in previous years, we feel the impression of precision became quite exaggerated. 
A good example of this is the role of exchange-rate changes. During most of 2013, the krone 
weakened quite a bit against most major currencies. This weakening came as the growth 
outlook weakened for the Norwegian economy and was accompanied by at least some decline 
in forward rate agreements (FRAs). As far as we can see, no other natural drivers of the krone 
exchange rate, such as the price of oil, were present to contribute to this weakening. A 
reasonable hypothesis would then be that the weakening was mainly the result of a revision of 
monetary policy expectations towards less tightening and perhaps more easing. Repeatedly, 
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however, the krone this time has weakened more than Norges Bank apparently feels it can 
explain that way, and it has thus labelled the rest an FX shock. Labelled that way, this part of 
the krone weakening thus pulls the Bank’s interest-rate forecast upward25. The judgement 
made is highly subjective, however. Although Norges Bank naturally admits to the 
uncertainty surrounding its analyses (e.g. in the form of uncertainty fans around the forecast 
graphs), the very fact that a numerical judgment is published gives an exaggerated impression 
of precision. 
Another example would be shocks to the output gap. Unexpectedly low recorded growth may 
reflect a temporary measurement error, a negative shock to the output gap, or a negative 
productivity shock. The first and the third of these interpretations would have much less of an 
effect on the rate forecast than the second one. In this case, movements in the unemployment 
rate and survey reports of capacity utilization provide some guidance, but much is still left to 
subjective judgment. That is unavoidable; but again the judgment calls made may be 
portrayed with a higher degree of certainty than they deserve. 
4.2.2 Modelling and disagreement 
Despite Norges Bank’s recent efforts to deemphasize formal modelling it is important to 
understand the basic premises of using a DSGE model. It is conditional forecasting, that is, 
forecasts made under the assumption of a certain policy rule. Moreover, the policy rule is to 
choose the optimal path of current and expected future policy rates. The forecasts thus derived 
must be understood as the outcome of an optimization process. The first optimization criterion 
is the flexible inflation target, that is, to bring inflation as quickly as possible back to the 
target without disrupting real activity too much, where the “too much” is defined by a weight 
on the output gap in the target function (the loss function) for the optimization process. As 
pointed out in Chapter 3, Norges Bank also adds two further criteria; that interest rates should 
not change too much too quickly and that interest rates should not stray too far from their 
long-term equilibrium values. 
This optimization exercise thus gives a level for the optimal current policy rate that then can 
be presented as a proposal to the board. However, it is important to understand that this rate is 
optimal only as the beginning of the model’s prediction of future optimal policy rates. 
                                                 
25 A currency weakening will naturally raise import prices and stimulate net exports regardless of cause. 
However, if it reflects the anticipation of monetary easing (or less-than-expected tightening) in the months 
ahead, these effects would occur sooner or later anyway, whereas an exogenous shock raises import prices over 
and above the effects of actual or anticipated policy easing.  
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Furthermore, for this prediction to be optimal, all agents in the economy—households, 
business, and government alike—must hold beliefs that match the model’s predictions of 
interest rates as well as all other variables. And, these beliefs must be correct. 
This is a tall order. Although this set of assumptions usually goes under the heading of 
rational expectations, it goes beyond the common understanding of rationality. In particular, it 
leaves no room for disagreement. In reality, disagreement is not only a common fact. It is also 
reasonable to expect and, in fact, a necessary condition for meaningful dialogue and debate. 
Although, as discussed in Chapter 5, the public is not informed about disagreements on 
Norges Bank’s board, it would be most unusual—and not particularly encouraging—if it did 
not exist. 
We thus believe that the model-inspired forecasts reported in Norges Bank’s MPRs should be 
supplemented by a public debate, where the external board members participate along with 
the Governor and Deputy Governor. Previous vintages of Norges Bank Watch have argued 
that such debate would benefit Norges Bank’s decision making. We concur with this view and 
believe a more open and transparent view of the decision making procedure in setting interest 
rates would also help Norges Bank’s forecasts and analyses in the right perspective. 
4.2.3 Whose reports? 
Most central banks issue forecast reports. In many cases, these are presented as staff reports. 
In Norges Bank, it is considered the Governor’s report. This calls for an iterative process. The 
staff starts by tallying up the news, tentatively translating it into shocks to the forecasting 
system, then tinkering with their assumptions until they produce forecasts they tentatively can 
believe in. These then are presented to department heads and subsequently to the Governor, 
who then considers the results and asks for changes. This process is then iterated until the 
Governor is satisfied. 
The public is not informed about any prior beliefs that the Governor might have at the 
beginning of each such process, nor about their strengths. As a result, it is not known to what 
extent the forecasts reflect such priors as opposed to model predictions or judgement formed 
as a result of the initial analysis. For outside readers, this would be useful information. The 
fact that the report is the Governor’s and not the staff’s hides it from the public. 
The board makes decisions about the current policy rate and the strategy interval until the next 
report, but does not necessarily endorse the report as such. The impression given to the public 
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is thus that the Governor presents a coherent set of proposals, based on careful staff analysis, 
guided by the Governor himself, which the board is then invited to accept, reject, or modify. 
In practice, however, the board is actually involved in the iteration process outlined above. 
This means that the reports in practice are jointly the board’s and the Governor’s. 
Our preference would rather be to let the report belong to the bank’s professional staff and 
career management. Indeed, the report should engage the collective reputation of the 
institution and its independent stance, not the Governor’s. Clarifying the authorship of the 
report would make it clearer whose judgment has gone into the analysis. A consequence could 
then naturally be that the board decides on a different policy rate than the report recommends. 
The board could even signal a forward guidance that differs from the forecast in the report. 
We would consider such a development healthy. It would uncover reasonable disagreements 
that would help rather than hurt a deeper understanding of the monetary policy making 
process among the general public. 
Making the report a staff report would return the board’s focus back to the decision about the 
current policy rate and somewhat away from the forecasting of future optimal rates. Given the 
strong assumptions behind such forecasts, we view that as an advantage. As discussed below, 
forward guidance must come back into focus if the policy rate should reach it zero lower 
bound. So far, however, that situation has not arisen for Norges Bank. 
Forecasts about the exchange rate are a natural part of the outcome of the DSGE analysis. As 
long as the Monetary Policy Report is presented as the Governor’s report, with the board 
involved in the process, the exchange-rate forecast could be mistaken by outside observers as 
a policy target. Removing the Governor and the board from the report’s authorship would 
help ensure that such misunderstandings do not arise. 
The iteration process indicated above must necessarily become somewhat lengthy. The 
assumptions first introduced by the staff risk getting stale by the time the policy decision is to 
be made. Switching to a different set of assumptions will certainly be possible, but may be 
hard to implement in practice. Furthermore, with four reports per year, one report will hardly 
be finished before the work on the next report needs to be started. We see a risk that this will 
not give the staff sufficient time to keep up with the relevant literature and communicate with 
professional peers inside and outside the Bank. 
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As a related point, we note that the 2013 policy meetings were spread somewhat unevenly 
throughout the year, with the March meeting three months after the December 2012 meeting, 
but the October 2013 meeting only five weeks after the September meeting. Although the 
October meeting was held without a new MPR, we would see an advantage of spreading the 
policy meetings more evenly over the year. 
4.2.4 Forward guidance: The benefits of setting guideposts 
Along with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and Sweden’s Riksbank, Norges Bank was one 
of the world’s three first central banks to provide forward guidance in the form of a forecast 
of the policy rate in calendar time. Other central banks, like the U.S. Federal Reserve, the 
Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan, have instead given conditional guidance. That is, 
they have stated conditions—sometimes referred to as guideposts—for when policy rates 
again are likely to be raised after the long period of near-zero rates following the 2007–09 
global recession. For example, the Fed has indicated that the unemployment rate needs to 
reach 6.5% before such tightening takes place, provided the inflation rate also stays below 
2.5%. Fed Chairs Bernanke and Yellen have emphasized that guideposts are not the same as 
benchmarks, that is, that the Federal Open Market Committee will look at the broader picture 
before making an actual decision. Even so, these guideposts are widely viewed by market 
participants as important indications for the conditions under which tightening is likely to be 
initiated. 
Such conditional guidance has the advantage of reducing uncertainty because it is easily 
understood, by market participants as well as the public at large. It gives more of a context 
than a forecast of future policy rates in calendar time. We suspect that it may even be more 
credible. The credibility of central-bank rate forecasts seems to have varied somewhat over 
time and from country to country. Norwegian market expectations have not deviated much 
from Norges Bank’s forecasts. But the persistent revisions of Norges Bank’s forecasts in the 
direction of postponing tightening further and further out into the future has by itself 
undermined their credibility. A conditional guidance could ameliorate that problem. 
On the other hand, the unconditional rate forecast contains useful information about Norges 
Bank’s analysis and indeed about its intentions. We thus do not recommend that the 
unconditional forward guidance be abandoned. We do recommend, however, that a possible 
supplement in the form of conditional guidance be explored. 
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5. Institutional issues 
Norges Bank’s institutional status has been addressed by a number of previous Norges Bank 
Watch reports. Our analysis concurs with their conclusions. Still, as some repeated 
recommendations have yet to be followed it is worth it to reiterate them here. In Section 5.2, 
we also add some of our own. 
5.1 Norges Bank’s constitutional role 
Although Norges Bank’s operational independence seems satisfactory, its legal subordination 
to the Ministry of Finance is not. The Minister’s authority to override important monetary 
policy decisions constitutes an important limitation to the independence of the central bank. 
The fact that this option has never been exercised may indicate a de facto independence. 
Nevertheless, the mere existence of this possibility, as well as the fact that it has not yet been 
removed, may appear as a threat to its independence. 
We are also somewhat critical of the custom of a regular meeting between the Governor and 
the Minister ahead of every policy meeting. Formally, the agenda for this meeting is simply to 
inform the Minister about the proposal that the Governor will put before the board. We also 
have no information suggesting that the real agenda is different. However, the very fact that 
these meetings take place sends an unfortunate signal of possible limits to Norges Bank’s 
independence. 
Central bank independence should not, of course, exempt the monetary authority from 
democratic control. However, democratic accountability requires a clear mandate. Although 
we approve of Norges Bank’s flexible inflation target, its mandate is also made somewhat 
murky by the continued reference to the krone’s external value26. We would recommend that 
this reference be taken out of the formal mandate. We would furthermore recommend that the 
democratic oversight function be moved from the Ministry of Finance to Parliament. These 
changes would move Norges Bank, as an institution, closer to the standard international 
framework. 
5.2 The board 
Previous vintages of Norges Bank Watch have criticized the absence of minutes and voting 
records from Norges Bank’s board’s policy meetings. We join this criticism and recommend 
that the board publish voting records with attribution and minutes without attribution. We also 
                                                 
26 §1 of the Regulation on monetary policy as of 29 March, 2001, reads, in official translation, “Monetary policy 
shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s national and international value...” (emphasis added). 
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would welcome public talks and statements by the board’s outside members. We expect that 
these changes would reveal a measure of disagreement within the board. We regard such 
disagreement as healthy, as they provide additional transparency to the making of monetary 
policy. We also believe that civilized disagreement, expressed in public, can raise the 
awareness of the important issues of monetary policy among the general public. We believe 
this would improve the central bank’s legitimacy rather than worsen it. 
Another issue concerning the board seems more urgent at present, however. This issue arises 
from the fact that Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, the Government Pension Fund Global 
(GPFG) is housed within the central bank, more specifically in its investment management 
unit, NBIM. This gives the board a dual or triple role. It serves as the monetary policy 
committee, but also as the board of oversight for the NBIM. Its overall oversight role for 
Norges Bank as a whole could be added as a third role. 
We are concerned that the sum of these tasks may be  excessive for a board whose majority 
(five out of seven) are external members who hold regular full-time jobs and thus have only 
their spare time at their disposal for their service on Norges Bank’s board. This combination 
of duties may have been acceptable during the early stages of NBIM’s existence when the 
GPFG was small and relatively simple. With a fund of about NOK 5 trillion, however, 
invested in a complex set of assets, including real estate, we are concerned that the board’s 
capacity may be strained. 
Empirical research on the corporate governance of commercial banks sheds some light on the 
issue of engagement, as Adams and Mehran(2010)27 document that interlocks adversely 
affects bank performance. Of course, it may be argued that the corporate governance of a 
central bank is completely different from the one of a commercial bank. Still, as far as 
availability, effort and engagement are concerned, it may be argued that the two are quite 
similar and that it seems only natural that an excessive burden of work leads to a decrease in 
the quality of advice and monitoring board members are expected to bring to the institution. 
Although we have not seen any indication of specific problems so far, we are seriously 
concerned about the board’s capacity to act effectively and efficiently during a crisis. An 
international crisis would likely require substantial attention in fund management and 
monetary policy at the same time, including the central bank’s role as a lender of last resort. 
                                                 
27 An	interlock	is	a	situation	where	the	chairman	or	the	CEO	of	a	bank	holding	company	is	a	director	in	
another	company	whose	top	management	is	on	the	board	of	the	bank	holding	company, 
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We can see a number of ways in which this situation could be improved. A natural suggestion 
would be to appoint two boards. In so far as the two boards require somewhat different skills 
this is quite natural. Of these two boards one would be a monetary policy committee to be led 
by the governor and with a similar composition as today’s board, that is, with members 
chosen from academia and the business community. This board would deal exclusively with 
monetary policy, albeit broadly defined, that is, including issues of financial stability and the 
bank’s role as lender of last resort28. The other board would be a board of oversight for 
Norges Bank’s entire organization, including, in particular, NBIM. This board would not 
necessarily be led by the Governor and should include among its members people with 
expertise in and experience with the economic and legal issues involved in asset management. 
A more radical solution would be to take the management of the GPFG out of Norges Bank 
altogether and establish it as a separate government institution with its own board. The 
discussion of such a change goes beyond our group’s mandate, however. 
The concern that we express about the time and work load of the external board members 
echoes similar remarks made in the reports by Norges Bank Watch 201229 and 201330. The 
proposal to split the board in two is our addition. So is the proposal in the next paragraph. 
A third issue concerns the recruitment of outside members to the board or a future monetary 
policy committee. We consider it desirable that the board, like today, has at least some 
members with formal expertise in monetary economics and related areas. However, because 
economists employed by financial institutions are ineligible for obvious reasons, the available 
supply of such people is in practice limited to academic economists. We are concerned that 
the supply of such people in Norway may be exhausted after a few natural iterations of board 
changes. And even if this supply is not exhausted, the use of academics on the board serves in 
practice to limit the public debate about monetary policy as long as the external board 
members do not express their views in public. We therefore recommend that candidates from 
other Scandinavian countries be considered as well. Non-Scandinavians could be equally 
desirable, but probably less suited for language reasons. The appointment of foreigners to the 
board would not only expand the pool of suitable and eligible candidates. Because foreigners 
                                                 
28 This recommendation is quite similar to the proposals recently made by an expert committee appointed by the 
Reserve Bank of India (2014): 
29 Torvik et al. (2012) 
30 Boye and Sveen (2013). 
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may offer different perspectives on Norwegian as well as international issues, it could also 
improve the quality of the decision making. 
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